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The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
of the Roberts Court 
KENNETH C. HAAS∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, four years after finding the nation’s death penalty laws to be 
constitutionally flawed, the U.S. Supreme Court established the parameters 
of modern American death penalty jurisprudence.  Since then the Court has 
gone through several phases.  The Court proceeded cautiously from 1977 
to 1982, limiting the death penalty to those who committed murder in a 
manner deemed especially heinous and despicable by judges and juries, 
requiring even-handedness and consistency in capital sentencing, and in-
sisting that sentencing authorities examine the individual characteristics of 
each offender and the particular circumstances of his crime.  From 1983 to 
2001, however, the Court took a more aggressive stance in favor of capital 
punishment.  The Justices rejected major constitutional challenges to the 
fairness of death penalty laws and upheld the constitutionality of executing 
mentally retarded offenders, sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, and 
felony accomplices who neither killed nor intended to kill.  Beginning in 
2002, the Justices once again began to scrutinize death penalty statutes and 
procedures closely and with a critical eye.  The Court reversed its holdings 
permitting the executions of mentally retarded offenders and juvenile of-
fenders, tightened standards for appellate review of the competence of 
capital defense attorneys, and invalidated sentencing procedures that 
seemed likely to produce arbitrary or discriminatory life-ending verdicts. 
In 2005, the composition of the Supreme Court changed for the first 
time in eleven years, foreshadowing still another shift in the Court’s deci-
sional tendencies in capital cases as well as in other areas of law.  On Sep-
tember 29, 2005, the U.S. Senate confirmed John Roberts, a judge on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, as the new Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, replacing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who 
passed away earlier that year.  A few months later, on January 31, 2006, 
the Senate confirmed Judge Samuel Alito of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit to fill the vacancy created by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s resignation from the Court.  As of the end of the Court’s 
  
 ∗ Professor of Sociology & Criminal Justice, University of Delaware; Ph.D. (Political Science) 
1978, Rutgers University. 
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2006–2007 term, Chief Justice Roberts had presided over two complete 
terms and Justice Alito had participated in most of the 2005–2006 term and 
the entire 2006–2007 term.  Both of the new Justices are likely to serve on 
the Court for many more years, and it is apparent that they already have 
begun to affect the substance and tone of the Court’s death penalty deci-
sions. 
This article focuses on the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurispru-
dence during the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 terms.  It begins with a brief 
review of the various approaches the Court took toward capital punishment 
from 1976 to 2005 and then analyzes the major death penalty decisions of 
the past two terms.  It is argued that the change in the composition of the 
Court has fostered still another reversal of course in the Court’s death pen-
alty rulings.  The Roberts Court has loosened the standards for evaluating 
the competence of capital defense attorneys, strengthened the hands of 
capital prosecutors, and upheld strict and constitutionally vulnerable statu-
tory and procedural roadblocks to the appellate review of capital sentences.  
Ironically, the public and a growing number of elected officials have ex-
pressed renewed concerns about the morality and effectiveness of death 
penalty laws.  The article concludes, however, that the Court’s reluctance 
to grant meaningful procedural safeguards to capital defendants and to 
impose further substantive limitations on the use of the death penalty is 
likely to continue in the 2007–2008 term and for at least the next several 
years. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF DEATH PENALTY LAW: 1972–2005 
A. Establishing a New Constitutional Framework: 1972–1976 
The modern era of American capital punishment jurisprudence began 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Furman v. Georgia1 decision in 1972.  
Striking down Georgia’s capital punishment statute, the Court indicated 
that all then-existing state and federal death penalty laws violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause2 because these 
laws failed to provide judges or juries with specific, clear, and fair guide-
lines to follow when deciding whether to sentence defendants to death and 
thus led to death sentences that were imposed in an arbitrary, capricious, or 
discriminatory manner.3  Over the next four years, thirty-five states enacted 
  
 1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 3. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–374.  The Furman decision generated ten opinions: a brief per curiam 
opinion and one by each of the nine Justices.  Of the five Justices who constituted the majority, two—
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new death penalty laws,4 but many opponents of capital punishment saw 
Furman as a decision that left little room to reconcile any death penalty 
law with the Constitution and were hopeful that the Court would soon 
bring an end to the American practice of capital punishment.5 
In 1976, however, the Court refused to take the next step.  In Gregg v. 
Georgia6 and its companion cases,7 the Court made it clear that the death 
penalty is not an unconstitutional punishment for the crime of murder so 
long as legitimate guidelines and proper procedures are used in reaching 
the decision to impose it.8  The Gregg Court upheld so-called “guided-
discretion” death penalty statutes that require two-stage capital trials—a 
guilt-adjudication stage to decide whether the defendant is guilty of a capi-
  
Justices Brennan and Marshall—would have gone further and found capital punishment to violate the 
Eighth Amendment under all circumstances.  See id. at 257–306, 314–71.  See generally Daniel D. 
Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?: Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1972). 
  The per curiam opinion states, in part, that “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty 
in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.  A careful reading of the opinions of the five Justices 
who made up the majority reveals that Furman is an Eighth Amendment holding.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment is mentioned only because the Court always cites it when it strikes down a state law on the 
basis of one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights that originally applied only against the federal gov-
ernment.  Through the historical process of “selective incorporation,” the Court has decided on a case-
by-case basis that most of the provisions of the first eight amendments to the Constitution are binding 
on the states as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that “[no state shall] deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments was one of 
those fundamental rights that must be enforced against state officials as well as federal officials in 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
  One year prior to Furman, the Court held that death penalty laws that leave the decision of 
whether to impose capital punishment to the unguided discretion of judges and juries—the same kind 
of laws found to violate the Eighth Amendment in Furman—do not violate the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).  The Court has never 
overruled McGautha, but it attempted, arguably unsuccessfully, to reconcile Furman and McGautha in 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 n.47 (1976).  See infra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
 4. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267–75 (2002). 
 5. See, e.g., MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT (1973). 
 6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  In addition to holding that capital punishment does not always violate the 
constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishments, Gregg also found Georgia’s post-Furman capital 
punishment statute to be constitutionally acceptable.  See id. at 196–207. 
 7. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of Texas’s post-Furman 
death penalty statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of Flor-
ida’s post-Furman death penalty statute). 
 8. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170–87.  The Gregg Court pointed out that when ratified in 1791, the 
cruel and unusual punishments clause clearly was not intended to apply to capital punishment.  Id. at 
176–79.  The Court cited the fact that thirty-five states enacted post-Furman capital punishment stat-
utes as strong evidence that the death penalty, at least when imposed for the taking of human life, did 
not offend contemporary society’s “evolving standards of decency.”  Id. at 179–82 (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  The Court also stressed that it was reasonable for legislatures to 
conclude that capital punishment serves at least two legitimate societal goals—retribution and deter-
rence—and that the death penalty therefore cannot be found to be nothing more than the needless and 
purposeless infliction of pain and suffering.  Id. at 182–87. 
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tal offense and a penalty stage to consider whether to impose the sentence 
of death.9  In the penalty stage, the jury (or in a few states, the judge) must 
consider specific “aggravating” and “mitigating” factors concerning the 
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s character and record, and 
then return with either a sentence of death or a sentence of lengthy (usually 
life) imprisonment.10 
Although the Gregg Court bestowed its approval on well-crafted 
guided-discretion laws, the Justices simultaneously struck down another 
type of death penalty law that several states enacted in the aftermath of 
Furman.  In Woodson v. North Carolina11 and Roberts v. Louisiana,12 a 
five-to-four majority ruled that mandatory death penalty laws—laws that 
automatically imposed the death sentence on defendants found guilty of 
first-degree murder or a particular type of murder—violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  Such laws, the majority reasoned, would undermine the 
Court’s new requirement that sentencing authorities must consider all rele-
vant information about the character of the offender and the nature of his 
crime.13  This, the majority declared, was now an indispensable part of the 
process of determining whether an offender truly deserved to die.14  Man-
datory death sentencing schemes, on the other hand, resulted in the “blind 
infliction” of the death penalty and thus were inconsistent with “the fun-
damental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.”15 
B. The Immediate Post-Gregg Years: 1977–1982 
From 1977 to 1982, the Court proceeded carefully while attempting to 
clarify the constitutional boundaries of capital punishment.  The Court, for 
example, limited capital punishment to cases in which the offender killed 
someone, holding that the death penalty is a disproportionate and thus un-
constitutional punishment for the crimes of rape16 and robbery17 where the 
victim is not killed as well as for people who participate with others in a 
felony that results in murder, but who neither kill, intend to kill, nor at-
  
 9. Id. at 188–95.  The Court did not mention that it had rejected the claim that the use of a unitary 
capital trial—one in which the jury determines both guilt and punishment after a single trial and in a 
single verdict—violates the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause in Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), a companion case to McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 10. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–207. 
 11. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 12. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 13. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 297–304. 
 14. Id. at 303–305. 
 15. Id. at 304. 
 16. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 17. Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam). 
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tempt to kill during the course of the crime.18  The Court also stressed that 
capital sentencers must consider all relevant mitigating evidence proved by 
the defense before returning a death sentence.19  Another early decision 
reflecting an effort to ensure fairness and reliability in capital sentencing 
was Godfrey v. Georgia,20 which established that the aggravating circum-
stances considered by capital juries must be defined clearly enough to pro-
vide meaningful guidance, thereby lessening the likelihood that death sen-
tences will be imposed arbitrarily.  In 1980, the Court invalidated an Ala-
bama law that prohibited trial judges from instructing jurors that they have 
the option to find a capital defendant guilty of a lesser included non-capital 
offense when the evidence supports such a verdict.21  And in Bullington v. 
Missouri,22 an important double jeopardy question was resolved when the 
Court held that a jury’s initial vote for life over death was an implied ac-
quittal of death penalty eligibility, thus precluding imposition of a death 
sentence after the defendant successfully appealed his first conviction but 
was reconvicted of the same crime.  In the immediate aftermath of Gregg, 
the Court seemed acutely aware that “death is a different kind of punish-
ment from any other”23 and should be imposed under stringent safeguards 
to ensure fairness and consistency. 
C. Expanding the Reach of Capital Punishment: 1983–2001 
From 1983 to 2001, the Court retreated from the cautious approach to 
capital punishment it took in the years immediately following Gregg.  The 
insistence on strict procedural safeguards was replaced by an attitude that it 
was time to “get on with it” and stop interfering with the will of the people 
as reflected by the laws passed by legislative bodies.24  For example, in 
Zant v. Stephens,25 the majority proclaimed that the states have a legitimate 
interest in speedier resolutions of capital cases and that “not every imper-
  
 18. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 19. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).  
 20. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
 21. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
 22. 451 U.S. 430 (1981). 
 23. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S 349, 357 (1977)).  
 24. Arguably, the Court’s emerging new attitude first became apparent in Justice Rehnquist’s dis-
sent from denial of certiorari in Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981).  Pointing to the lengthy 
appeals process in capital cases, Justice Rehnquist lamented that “[g]iven so many bites at the apple, 
the odds favor petitioner finding some court willing to vacate his death sentence because in its view his 
trial or sentence was not free from constitutional error.”  Id. at 957.  Urging his colleagues to make a 
better effort to expedite the administration of the death penalty, Rehnquist referred to the slow pace of 
executions as a “mockery of our criminal justice system.”  Id. at 958.  
 25. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
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fection in the deliberative process is sufficient . . . to set aside a state court 
judgment.”26 
Some of the Court’s holdings during this period reiterated the need for 
fairness in capital proceedings, but most of the Court’s late twentieth cen-
tury death penalty jurisprudence proved to be disadvantageous for capital 
defendants and inmates already sentenced to die.  This trend became evi-
dent in cases raising the issue of whether state death penalty procedures 
gave the defendant a full opportunity to make juries aware of all relevant 
mitigating evidence.27  The Court did not repudiate its position that the 
sentencer must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating circum-
stances when deciding whether or not to sentence a defendant to death.  
However, the reach of these decisions was circumscribed by decisions such 
as Johnson v. Texas.28  In Johnson, the Court held that the judge’s failure 
to explicitly instruct the jury to consider mitigating evidence about the 
defendant’s age did not prevent the jury from considering the mitigating 
effect of the defendant’s youth.29 
The Court also backed away, without fully retreating, from its 
Woodson-Roberts stance against mandatory death penalty laws.  In 1987, a 
five-to-four majority invalidated a Nevada law that mandated a death sen-
tence in all cases in which a prisoner is convicted of murder while serving 
a life-without-parole prison sentence.30  Three years later, however, the 
Court upheld a California law that requires capital juries to impose the 
death penalty if they find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any 
mitigating circumstances31 and a Pennsylvania law that requires a death 
sentence when a capital jury finds at least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance and no mitigating circumstances.32  The Court distinguished 
these cases from the Woodson and Roberts cases by explaining that a death 
sentence is not automatically triggered upon a murder conviction: “It is 
imposed only after a determination that the aggravating circumstances 
  
 26. Id. at 885; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887–96 (1983) (bestowing approval on 
expedited review procedures to be followed by federal appeals courts in order to speed death penalty 
appeals toward a final resolution).  In Barefoot, the Court also upheld the admissibility of testimony by 
state-hired psychiatrists in Texas who regularly told capital-sentencing juries that defendants, if not 
executed, were certain to commit future violent crimes.  463 U.S. at 896–99.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice White conceded that research studies showed that “expert” predictions about future dangerous-
ness turn out to be incorrect sixty-six percent of the time.  See id. at 898–903.  He dismissed the impor-
tance of such studies, however, stressing that psychiatrists are not wrong about future dangerousness all 
of the time, “only most of the time.”  Id. at 901. 
 27. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 28. 509 U.S. 350 (1993). 
 29. See id. at 368–70. 
 30. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). 
 31. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). 
 32. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
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outweigh the mitigating circumstances present in the particular crime 
committed by the particular defendant, or that there are no such mitigating 
circumstances.”33 
The Court’s greater willingness to defer to the political branches of 
government in this time period had the effect of broadening the class of 
death-eligible defendants.  In Tison v. Arizona,34 the Court modified its 
earlier decision disallowing the death penalty for felony murderers—non-
killers who participate with others in a felony that leads to murder.35  The 
Tison Court held that even when such offenders neither killed nor intended 
to kill, they nevertheless could be sentenced to death if they participated in 
the underlying felony in a “major” way and if they exhibited a “reckless 
indifference to human life” while doing so.36  The Court also upheld the 
constitutionality of laws permitting the execution of mentally retarded of-
fenders37 and juvenile offenders.38  Even in the face of overwhelming sta-
tistical evidence of racial bias in capital sentencing in Georgia, the Court 
repudiated Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the fairness of 
that state’s capital punishment statute.39 
  
 33. Id. at 305. 
 34. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 35. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 150–58. 
 37. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 38. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 39. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  In McCleskey, the Court heard a major constitu-
tional challenge to the death sentence imposed on an African-American man convicted of murdering a 
white police officer in a Georgia furniture store robbery.  Id. at 283 (stating facts).  McCleskey’s attor-
neys presented the Court with statistical evidence that Georgia’s post-Gregg capital-sentencing proce-
dures were saturated with racial discrimination and thus violated both the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection under the law and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments.  Id. at 286–290.  The evidence consisted of a detailed and methodologically sophisticated 
study of over 2000 murder cases in which the death penalty could have been imposed in Georgia during 
the 1970s.  Id.  The study revealed, inter alia, that death sentences were imposed in twenty-two percent 
of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; eight percent of the cases involving white 
defendants and white victims; three percent of the cases involving white defendants and black victims; 
and one percent of the cases involving black defendants and black victims.  Id. at 286. 
  Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Powell assumed for the purposes of reaching the 
constitutional issues that the study was statistically valid.  Id. at 292 n.7.  He explained, however, that 
the study did not and could not prove McCleskey’s allegation of an equal protection violation because 
to prevail under the equal protection clause, a death-sentenced petitioner would have to prove what 
McCleskey could not prove—that the state legislators who passed Georgia’s death penalty statute did 
so for the very purpose of furthering racially discriminatory capital sentencing or that “the decision-
makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”  Id. at 292.  As for the argument that the study 
showed that the Georgia death penalty was arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied in violation of 
Furman’s proclamation that arbitrary or discriminatory death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment, 
Justice Powell responded that the study indicates, at most “a discrepancy that appears to correlate with 
race,” that apparent disparities in sentencing are inevitable in both capital and non-capital cases, and 
that the study thus does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of capricious or discrimina-
tory capital sentencing.  Id. at 312, 313–15.  In dissent, Justice Brennan accused the majority of ignor-
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D. Renewed Caution and New Limitations on Death Eligibility: 2002–2005  
From 2002 to 2005, the Court clearly began to take a more accommo-
dating approach towards constitutional issues raised by death-row petition-
ers.  During this period, the Court announced two major decisions reducing 
the categories of offenders eligible for capital punishment and several other 
decisions that demonstrated greater concern about the rights of capital de-
fendants. 
To be sure, the Court did not stray too far from its tendency to uphold 
constitutionally problematic laws and procedures that work to the advan-
tage of capital prosecutors.  A number of significant decisions in the 2002–
2005 time period tightened restrictions on death penalty appeals and re-
jected capital defendants’ constitutional claims.  For example, in a 2003 
case, Woodford v. Garceau,40 the Court held that limits on capital appeals 
that were included in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
199641 (AEDPA) apply even to capital appeals that were in a preliminary 
stage before the AEDPA was enacted.  Writing for a six-justice majority, 
Justice Thomas asserted that only substantive appeals that had been for-
mally filed in a federal court before the passage of the AEDPA were ex-
empt from the new appeals limits.42  Thus, death-sentenced inmates who 
had taken only such preliminary steps as seeking a motion for a stay of 
execution or requesting court appointment of an attorney had not truly ini-
tiated what could be called a “case” and would be bound by the AEDPA’s 
new restrictions.43 
In another important 2003 ruling, the Court undermined its 1981 ruling 
in Bullington v. Missouri44 that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy 
clause applies to capital-sentencing proceedings.  In Sattazahn v. Pennsyl-
vania,45 the Court explained that in Bullington, the jury, by voting for life 
imprisonment over a death sentence, had, in effect, “acquitted” the defen-
dant of the factors necessary to impose the death sentence.46  In Sattazahn’s 
case, however, the trial judge, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, had imposed 
a life sentence after the jury deadlocked on whether to sentence the defen-
  
ing “precisely the type of risk of irrationality in sentencing that we have consistently condemned in our 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”  Id. at 321. 
 40. 538 U.S. 202 (2003). 
 41. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 42. Woodford, 538 U.S. at 205–10. 
 43. Id. at 207–09. 
 44. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 45. 537 U.S. 101 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 107–08. 
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dant to death.47  Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Scalia con-
tended that this was a “non-result” that was not the equivalent of an “ac-
quittal” that would have established a legal entitlement to a life sentence.48 
However, the Court’s greater willingness to rule in favor of capital de-
fendants from 2002 until 2005 was unmistakable.  For example, in a 2003 
case, Miller-El v. Cockrell,49 the Court, with only Justice Thomas dissent-
ing, ordered a federal appeals court to grant a habeas hearing to a death-
row inmate who made a “substantial showing” that the selection of his jury 
had been infected by racial prejudice.50  After the appellate court again 
denied the inmate’s claim, the Supreme Court again took his case and re-
versed the ruling of the appellate court.  In Miller-El v. Dretke,51 the Court 
vacated the conviction and death sentence, stressing that prosecutors had 
used peremptory challenges to remove ten of eleven eligible black jury 
panelists from the trial jury and had failed to offer credible race-neutral 
reasons for doing so.52 
It is equally telling that after years of routinely rejecting death penalty 
appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,53 the Su-
preme Court began to take such claims seriously.  For example, in Wiggins 
  
 47. Id. at 104–05. 
 48. Id. at 109–10. 
 49. 537 U.S. 322 (2003). 
 50. See id. at 326–48.  The guidelines for preventing purposeful racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion were spelled out in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit prosecutors to systematically exclude black 
veniremen from juries and providing that once the defendant makes a prima facie case indicating that 
race was a factor in the state’s decision to exercise a peremptory challenge, the burden falls on the 
prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason for striking the juror). 
 51. 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 52. Id. at 253–66. 
 53. The Court established the current standard for determining whether a defendant’s conviction or 
death sentence must be reversed because his attorney’s assistance was so defective as to constitute a 
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984).  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion ordained a two-part test: 
First the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘coun-
sel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the defi-
cient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 687.  O’Connor’s opinion stressed repeatedly that appellate courts must be highly deferential to 
the choices made by defense attorneys and must not jump to the conclusion that an attorney’s actions, 
omissions, or tactics were deficient or harmful to the client’s case without taking into account all of the 
circumstances the attorney confronted and doing so “within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.”  Id. at 689.  Subsequently, the Court rejected ineffective-assistance claims in several 
prominent capital cases.  See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776 (1987).  This led a number of commentators to argue that Strickland is “toothless” and is 
especially inadequate for measuring attorney competence in capital trials.  See generally Donald J. 
Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 225 (2004) (discussing 
claims that the Strickland standard is poorly suited for evaluating attorney competence in capital cases). 
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v. Smith,54 the Court reversed a federal appellate court’s finding that a 
death-row inmate’s trial lawyers had performed competently even though 
they failed to investigate and inform the sentencing jury of their client’s 
severe childhood abuse.55  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion contended 
that it was clear from the trial record that the performance of the attorneys 
fell well below minimally acceptable standards and that there was a rea-
sonable possibility that if the jury had been aware of the nature and extent 
of the mitigating evidence, it would have returned with a different sen-
tence.56  In light of all the circumstances, the majority concluded, trial 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby violating 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.57  
Two years later, in Rompilla v. Beard,58 the Court upheld an ineffective-
assistance claim even though defense attorneys had interviewed their capi-
tal client, his family, and mental health experts in an effort to uncover 
mitigating evidence.59  A five-to-four majority nevertheless found that de-
fense attorneys had been deficient because they failed to examine their 
client’s prior conviction file—a readily available public document—and 
the file would have yielded significant mitigating evidence about the de-
fendant’s childhood, mental health, and alcoholism.60 
The death penalty laws of five states were changed as the result of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona.61  In Ring, the Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial requires 
that a jury, not a judge, must make the factual findings—for example, the 
finding that at least one aggravating factor exists—that subject a murder 
defendant to the death penalty.62  By striking down Arizona’s death-
sentencing law, under which judges alone decided whether the crime in-
cluded aggravating factors sufficient to warrant a possible death sentence, 
  
 54. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 55. Id. at 510–19. 
 56. Id. at 522–27. 
 57. Id. at 531–38. 
 58. 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 59. Id. at 377–80. 
 60. Id. at 381–93. 
 61. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 62. Id. at 596–609.  The Ring Court reasoned that its holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000), which held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a jury, not a judge, must 
make any factual determination that increases the length of a criminal defendant’s prison sentence 
beyond the prescribed statutory minimum, was simply irreconcilable with its earlier decision in Walton 
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which upheld the constitutionality of a death penalty statute that 
required a judge, not a jury, to make the factual finding that a capital crime encapsulated at least one 
aggravating factor making the defendant eligible for the death penalty.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 596–609.  
The Court therefore overruled Walton, observing that “[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to 
increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.”  Id. 
at 609. 
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the Ring holding had the effect of invalidating similar laws in Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska.63  Ring also raised questions that still have 
not been clearly resolved about the constitutionality of laws in four other 
states—Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana—in which the judge 
decides between life and death after considering the jury’s recommenda-
tion.64  In Schriro v. Summerlin,65 the Court made it clear that Ring applies 
only prospectively, not retroactively, to death-row inmates whose convic-
tions and sentences were final at the time Ring was decided.  Nevertheless, 
many legal scholars believe—although there is some debate over the mat-
ter—that over the long run, juries will impose fewer death sentences than 
judges would have imposed in the states where judges will no longer make 
the factual determinations that can lead to a death sentence.66 
Two death penalty holdings—the first in 2002 and the second in 
2005—changed the legal landscape significantly and can be expected to 
reduce the number of death sentences imposed in the United States.  In 
Atkins v. Virginia,67 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders and in Roper v. 
Simmons,68 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.  In Atkins, the Court, by 
a six-to-three vote, overruled its 1989 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh.69  The 
Penry Court, in an opinion authored by Justice O’Connor, concluded that 
the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the execution of mentally retarded 
offenders.  The Penry majority stressed that as of 1989 only two states had 
passed laws exempting the mentally retarded from death sentences.70  By 
2002, however, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Atkins majority opin-
ion—which was joined by Justice O’Connor as well as by Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter—the legislative landscape had changed.  
Between 1989 and 2002, sixteen more states passed laws banning the exe-
cution of mentally retarded offenders.71  This brought the total number of 
states banning such executions to thirty—the twelve states banning all exe-
cutions and eighteen of the thirty-eight states with capital punishment laws.  
  
 63. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say Death Penalty Is Up to Juries, Not Judges, N.Y. TIMES, June 
25, 2002, at A1. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
 66. Adam Liptak, Fewer Death Sentences Likely if Juries Make Ultimate Decision, Experts Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at A21. 
 67. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 68. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 69. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 70. Id. at 334. 
 71. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15. 
File: Haas - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on:  3/5/2008 9:28:00 PM Last Printed: 3/10/2008 10:16:00 PM 
398 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 6, No. 3 
 
According to the majority, this was enough to establish a national consen-
sus against the execution of mentally retarded offenders.72 
The Atkins dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Jus-
tice Thomas) criticized the majority for discerning a national consensus 
against executing mentally retarded offenders in the face of the fact that 
twenty states retained laws permitting such executions.73  But Justice Ste-
vens claimed that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”74  He added 
that it is also significant that executions of mentally retarded offenders 
were rare in most states and that in the years after Penry, only five states—
Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia—executed any 
offenders known to be mentally retarded.75  “The practice, therefore, has 
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has 
developed against it.”76 
This new legislative consensus, Justice Stevens added, was supported 
by a long-established social and professional consensus.77  Public opinion 
polls indicated that the majority of Americans were against executing the 
mentally retarded.78  Respected professional and religious organizations, 
including the American Psychological Association and the United States 
Catholic Conference, were opposed to such executions.79  The majority 
also took into account the fact that “within the world community, the im-
position of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded 
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”80 
Justice Stevens also asserted that it was difficult to square the practice 
of executing the mentally retarded with the Gregg-approved goals of retri-
bution and deterrence.81  The purpose of retribution—making sure that a 
criminal gets his “just deserts”—cannot be truly achieved by executing 
people who have a diminished ability to understand the consequences of 
their actions.82  Similarly, the goal of deterrence is not likely to be achieved 
by threatening to execute people who have impaired abilities to learn from 
experience and process information about the possibility of execution as a 
  
 72. Id. at 315–16. 
 73. Id. at 341–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 315 (majority opinion).   
 75. Id. at 316 & n.20.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 317–20. 
 82. Id. at 319. 
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punishment for their conduct.83  Accordingly, the majority concluded that 
the execution of mentally retarded offenders is little more than the needless 
and purposeless infliction of suffering and violates the Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.84 
The Atkins holding naturally spurred speculation that the Supreme 
Court would soon reverse another important 1989 decision—its decision in 
Stanford v. Kentucky85 to permit executions of sixteen- and seventeen-year-
  
 83. Id. at 319–20.  Justice Stevens asserted that the case for categorically excluding the mentally 
retarded from execution is buttressed by evidence that mentally retarded persons are more likely than 
other suspects to confess to a crime they did not commit and less likely to provide full and meaningful 
information and support to defense counsel.  Id. at 320.  He added that mentally retarded defendants 
“are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of 
remorse for their crimes.”  Id. at 321. 
 84. Id. at 319–21.  The Atkins majority cited two definitions of mental retardation—one provided by 
the American Association of Mental Retardation and one gleaned from the diagnostic manual of the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA).  Id. at 308–09 & n.3.  The two are not identical, but both 
stress significantly sub-average intellectual functioning and significant limitations in such skill areas as 
communication, social skills, home living, and self care.  Id.  Both organizations characterize mental 
retardation as developing before the age of eighteen, and the APA diagnostic manual adds that 
“‘[m]ild’ mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an I.Q. level of 50–55 to ap-
proximately 70.”  Id. at 309.  The Atkins majority, however, declined to endorse one of the two defini-
tions or to offer its own, leaving it to each state to establish its own definition and procedures for de-
termining whether a defendant is, in fact, mentally retarded.  Id. at 317.  The result has been extraordi-
nary confusion, extended trial and appellate hearings, and differences among states to the extent that a 
defendant judged not to be mentally retarded in one state could very possibly have been judged as 
mentally retarded by another.  See generally Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can 
of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2003). 
 85. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).  The Stanford Court divided on a five-to-four basis.  Justice Scalia wrote 
the plurality opinion and Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion explaining that she 
agreed with the judgment and much of Justice Scalia’s opinion, but did not fully support all of his 
arguments.  She nonetheless provided the crucial fifth vote to sustain the constitutionality of executing 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.  Justice Scalia pointed out that executing juvenile offenders 
was not considered to be cruel and was not unusual when the Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791.  
Id. at 368.  Equally important, there was insufficient evidence of a contemporary national consensus 
against executing juvenile offenders since “[o]f the 37 States whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 
decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders.”  
Id. at 370.  In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor disputed some of Justice Scalia’s arguments 
including his contention that state laws distinguishing juveniles from adults for noncriminal purposes—
driving, drinking, voting and other such laws—were irrelevant to the Court’s analysis.  Id. at 382 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  She made it clear, however, that she agreed with the plurality’s most 
compelling point—that the majority of the states that authorize capital punishment permit it to be 
imposed for crimes committed at the age of 16.  Id. at 381. 
  Justice O’Connor also cast the fifth vote one year earlier in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815 (1988).  In Thompson, Justice Stevens authored a plurality opinion holding that the execution of 
offenders who were fifteen or younger at the time of their offense impinges the ban on cruel and un-
usual punishments.  See id. at 818–38.  Justice O’Connor’s Thompson concurrence noted that nineteen 
of the thirty-seven states that then authorized capital punishment had not set a statutory minimum age 
for imposing it, thus weakening the argument that there was a national consensus against executing 
fifteen-year-olds.  Id. at 850–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  She also expressed doubt that all fifteen-
year-olds are incapable of possessing the moral blameworthiness that would justify capital punishment.  
Id. at 853.  She explained, however, that “[t]he most salient statistic that bears on this case is that [each 
of the 18 legislatures] that has expressly set a minimum age for capital punishment has set that age at 
16 or above.”  Id. at 849.  Nevertheless, she concluded her opinion by inviting “the people’s elected 
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old offenders.  The arguments for excluding juvenile offenders from death 
eligibility are very similar to the arguments that were offered by the Atkins 
majority.86  But the Atkins majority pointedly noted that even though Stan-
ford and Penry were decided on the same day in 1989, only two states sub-
sequently raised the minimum age for imposing the death penalty to eight-
een, as compared to the sixteen states that had enacted legislation ending 
the execution of mentally retarded offenders.87  By 2005, however, three 
more states raised the threshold age for death eligibility to eighteen,88 and 
this was enough to convince the majority of the Court to reverse Stanford. 
In Roper v. Simmons,89 five of the six Justices who constituted the At-
kins majority concluded that the cruel and unusual punishments clause 
forbids execution for crimes committed by offenders under eighteen years 
of age.  Justice O’Connor joined the majority in Atkins, but she dissented 
in Roper for two major reasons.  First, she asserted that there had not been 
enough change in legislative trends to justify overruling Stanford.90  Sec-
ond, she reasoned that whereas mentally retarded offenders as a class suf-
fer from major, lifelong impairments that make death an excessive pun-
ishment, some seventeen-year-old murderers are mature enough, and 
blameworthy enough, to deserve the death penalty.91 
The Roper majority opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy, who 
sixteen years earlier joined in Justice Scalia’s Stanford plurality opinion.  
Now, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, he chal-
lenged both O’Connor’s Roper arguments and the arguments he had em-
  
representatives” to decide the issue one way or another.  Id. at 858–59.  Her invitation was declined.  
No state subsequently enacted a law permitting death sentences to be assessed against offenders under 
the age of sixteen. 
 86. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Haas, A Matter of Years: The Juvenile Death Penalty and the United States 
Supreme Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 309–35 (Albert R. 
Roberts ed., 2004). 
 87. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 n.18.  The two states that raised the threshold age for death-sentence 
eligibility were Indiana and Montana.  Id. 
 88. The third of the three states did so not by enacting new legislation, but by way of a decision by 
its highest court.  In State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), the Missouri Su-
preme Court ruled, contrary to the then existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent of Stanford v. Kentucky, 
that executing offenders under the age of eighteen violated the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment 
bar on cruel and unusual punishment.  The Missouri tribunal cited Kansas and New York as having 
recently passed laws limiting capital punishment to offenders who were eighteen or older at the time of 
their crime and stressed that the legal landscape on the question of executing juvenile offenders now 
was very similar to the legal landscape the Atkins Court found sufficient to ascertain a national consen-
sus against executing mentally retarded offenders.  Id. at 407–09.  The court also stressed that, as in 
Atkins, the direction of legislative change was consistent and that juvenile executions had become 
increasingly rare in the states that still allowed them.  Id. at 408–10.  Most important, the court took the 
position that its holding should not be based on the state of American law when Stanford was decided 
in 1989, but on the current state of the law and “current—2003—standards of decency.”  Id. at 407. 
 89. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 90. Id. at 593–98 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 598–603. 
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braced in 1989.  Justice Kennedy conceded that changes in state laws per-
taining to the minimum age for imposing capital punishment had come 
more slowly than had changes relevant to the issue of executing mentally 
retarded criminals.92  He claimed, however, that the contemporary evidence 
of a national consensus against executing juveniles was in many respects 
similar to the evidence relied upon in Atkins.93  He also contended that 
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were similar to mentally retarded adults 
in that they are more vulnerable to negative influences, less likely to be 
capable of controlling their immediate surroundings, and are in other ways 
substantially less blameworthy than most adult criminals.94 
Justice Kennedy’s comparison of the legislative landscapes applicable 
to both Atkins and Roper showed that one of the key factors used in both 
cases was in fact identical.  By 2002, when Atkins was decided, eighteen of 
the thirty-eight states that authorized capital punishment banned executions 
of the mentally retarded, and by 2005, when Roper was decided, eighteen 
of the thirty-eight states authorizing capital punishment banned executions 
of offenders under the age of eighteen.95  Thus, Roper was analogous to 
Atkins in that “30 states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 
that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, 
by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its 
reach.”96 
The majority acknowledged that the pace of change had been much 
faster on the issue of executing mentally retarded offenders—from two 
death penalty states banning such executions in 1989 to eighteen in 2002—
than it had been on the issue of executing juvenile offenders—from thir-
teen death penalty states banning such executions to eighteen in 2005.97  
The slower rate of abolition, according to Justice Kennedy, was not nearly 
as important as what was the most significant similarity in both cases—
“the consistency of the direction of change.”98  He added that it would 
make little sense to permit juvenile executions to continue simply because 
the wrongfulness of executing juveniles was widely recognized sooner 
than it was recognized for the mentally retarded.99  Justice Kennedy argued 
that it was also essential to take into account the rarity of executing juve-
niles even in the twenty states that still allowed it.  “Since Stanford, six 
states have executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles [and in] 
  
 92. Id. at 565–67 (majority opinion). 
 93. Id. at 564–65. 
 94. Id. at 568–71. 
 95. Id. at 564. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 564–65. 
 98. Id. at 565–66. 
 99. Id. at 566–67. 
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the past 10 years, only three states have done so: Oklahoma, Texas and 
Virginia.”100 
Justice Kennedy relied heavily upon the kinds of evidence that Justice 
Scalia’s Stanford opinion characterized as irrelevant.101  He emphasized 
that social science studies indicate that juveniles are more likely to be im-
mature, impetuous, and reckless than are adults.102  Such studies also dis-
close that juveniles are much more likely than adults to be influenced by 
antisocial peer pressure, to have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, 
and to lack control of their emotions.103  “In recognition of the comparative 
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits 
those under eighteen years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marry-
ing without parental consent.”104  This was enough to satisfy the majority 
that the two major penological justifications for the death penalty—
retribution and deterrence—apply to juveniles with considerably less force 
than to adults.105 
In Atkins, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion cited the overwhelming 
disapproval of the practice of executing mentally retarded offenders 
“within the world community,” but did so in a brief footnote.106  By con-
trast, Justice Kennedy devoted six full paragraphs of the Roper majority 
opinion to international law.107  It was appropriate for the Court to look to 
the laws of other nations and international organizations as instructive for 
interpreting the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, he explained, because 
“[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, 
does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclu-
sions.”108  Justice Kennedy cited Article 37 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child as expressly prohibiting capital punishment 
for crimes committed by juveniles under the age of eighteen and pointedly 
noted that every nation in the world had ratified it except for the United 
  
 100. Id. at 564–65. 
 101. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374–80 (declaring that laws establishing a minimum age for such 
activities as drinking alcohol, serving on juries, or voting are irrelevant to the issue of the constitution-
ality of executing juvenile murderers, as are such indicia as scientific studies of adolescent behavior, 
public opinion polls, the positions taken by various professional associations, and trends in interna-
tional law); id. at 378 (“The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth Amendment; and in 
that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not an available 
weapon.  The punishment is either ‘cruel and unusual’ (i.e. society has set its face against it) or it is not.  
The audience for these arguments, in other words, is not this Court but the citizenry of the United 
States.”). 
 102. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 569. 
 105. Id. at 571–73. 
 106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. 
 107. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–79. 
 108. Id. at 578. 
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States and Somalia.109  He found it especially compelling that since 1990 
only seven nations other than the United States had executed juveniles—
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and China—and all of these countries now have renounced the 
practice, leaving the United States as “alone in a world that has turned its 
face against the juvenile death penalty.”110 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
responded with a scalding dissent that, unlike Justice O’Connor’s dissent-
ing opinion, took issue with every argument presented by the majority.111  
Like the Atkins dissenters, he criticized the majority for finding a national 
consensus against imposing the death penalty on seventeen-year-old of-
fenders despite the fact that twenty of the thirty-eight states with death 
penalty laws still authorized such executions.112  “Words have no meaning 
if the views of less than fifty percent of death penalty States can constitute 
a national consensus.”113  The twelve states with no death penalty, Justice 
Scalia insisted, should not be part of the calculus for discerning a national 
consensus against juvenile executions because these states have not had to 
grapple with the specific issue of whether to exempt juveniles from the 
death penalty.114  Including these states in the legislative analysis “is rather 
like including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the 
electric car.”115  The truth of the matter, as Scalia saw it, was that the ma-
jority of states that authorize executions had considered arguments to abol-
ish juvenile executions, but had decided that the best policy was to leave it 
to state officials—and ultimately to juries—to make the admittedly rare 
decision, based on the evidence accrued at a fair trial, that a particular sev-
enteen-year-old, with full understanding of what he was doing, committed 
an especially heinous murder and deserved to die for it.116  He sardonically 
added that “[t]he attempt by the Court to turn its remarkable minority con-
sensus into a faux majority by counting Amishmen is an act of nomologi-
cal desperation.”117 
The dissenting Justices also chastised the majority for taking the views 
of “the so-called international community” into account when interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution.118  Justice Scalia declared that the majority’s notion 
  
 109. Id. at 576. 
 110. Id. at 577. 
 111. See id. at 607–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 608–09. 
 113. Id. at 609. 
 114. Id. at 610–11. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 611–15. 
 117. Id. at 611. 
 118. Id. at 622. 
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that American law should be informed by, let alone conform to, the laws of 
other countries or international bodies should be repudiated, and he ac-
cused the majority of citing trends in international law only when doing so 
supported the personal views of the majority Justices.119  It was revealing, 
he wrote, that no one in the Roper or Atkins majorities ever pointed out that 
the controversial American exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of 
illegally seized evidence in criminal cases, has been rejected by every other 
nation in the world and even by the European Court of Human Rights.120  It 
was even more telling, he added, that none of the majority Justices had 
ever taken the position that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, making the 
United States “one of only six countries that allow abortion on demand 
until the point of viability,” should be informed by the international com-
munity.121  “Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth 
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Consti-
tution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of 
this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.”122 
III.  ANOTHER REVERSAL OF COURSE 
A. The Changed Composition of the Court 
The tone of the majority and dissenting opinions in Atkins and Roper 
displayed a Court that was bitterly divided on death penalty questions.  
Both holdings reduced the reach of the death penalty and must be consid-
ered major victories for opponents of capital punishment.  However, the 
death penalty holdings of the Court’s 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 terms 
indicate that similar victories are unlikely in the near future and that the 
Court is returning to the death penalty jurisprudence of the 1983 to 2001 
period.  Abolitionists have succeeded in changing public attitudes toward 
capital punishment in recent years, and the death penalty is under attack in 
an increasing number of states.123  But for the immediate future, the more 
important change is in the composition of the Supreme Court. 
From 1994 to 2005, the composition of the Court did not change.  In 
the area of capital punishment law, this more often than not resulted in 
voting alignments in which Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens 
found constitutional problems with death penalty laws and in which Chief 
  
 119. Id. at 622–27. 
 120. Id. at 624–25. 
 121. Id. at 625–26. 
 122. Id. at 608. 
 123. See infra notes 285–326 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas found no such prob-
lems.  This often put Justice O’Connor or Justice Kennedy in the position 
of a so-called “swing justice” whose fifth vote could tilt the balance in 
favor of invalidating death penalty laws and reversing death sentences.  
This pattern began to emerge with greater frequency from 2002 until 2005, 
most significantly in Atkins where O’Connor and Kennedy provided the 
fifth and sixth votes and in Roper where Kennedy provided the fifth vote. 
Eleven years was an unusually long time for the same nine Justices to 
serve on the Supreme Court, and the beginning of change came on July 1, 
2005, when Justice O’Connor announced her intention to retire effective 
upon the confirmation of her successor.124  Soon thereafter, President Bush 
announced the appointment of Judge John Roberts of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia.  However, on September 3, before 
the U.S. Senate could act on the Roberts nomination, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist passed away after several years of struggling with thyroid can-
cer and other health problems.  This left two vacancies on the Court and 
the President quickly withdrew his nomination of Roberts to replace 
O’Connor as an Associate Justice and instead appointed him to succeed 
Rehnquist as Chief Justice.  The Senate easily confirmed Roberts as the 
new Chief Justice on September 29, 2005.  With her successor still to be 
determined, Justice O’Connor continued to serve well into the Court’s 
2005–2006 term.  On October 31, 2005, President Bush nominated Judge 
Samuel Alito of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to replace 
O’Connor.  The Senate confirmed Alito on January 31, 2006, thereby al-
lowing O’Connor to step down. 
When the Supreme Court’s 2006–2007 term ended on June 28, 2007, it 
was very clear that the two changes in the Court’s composition had yielded 
a Court that was more ideologically conservative than its predecessor in 
every area of law including criminal law generally and capital punishment 
law in particular.  So far, Chief Justice Roberts has mirrored the thinking 
and voting of Chief Justice Rehnquist in capital cases.  As a federal appeals 
judge, Roberts was regarded as moderate-to-conservative on most issues, 
but his ideological tendencies in criminal cases could not be reliably pre-
dicted because he had served on the D.C. Circuit for only two years and 
that circuit handles relatively few criminal cases.125  In speeches and inter-
views, the new Chief Justice said that he hoped that he could help to 
  
 124. The sequence of events beginning with Justice O’Connor’s retirement announcement and ending 
with the confirmation of Justice Alito on January 31, 2006 is chronicled along with behind-the-scene 
details in JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 185–315 (2007) and JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE 
NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 240–336 (2007). 
 125. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 2007, at 104. 
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achieve greater consensus among the Justices in important areas of law and 
to reduce the number of five-to-four decisions, particularly the ones that 
produce acrimonious opinion writing.126 
B. The Supreme Court’s 2005–2006 Term Death Penalty Decisions 
In the 2005–2006 term, the Court decided relatively few controversial 
cases in the criminal law area and in other areas of law, and there was an 
increase in unanimous opinions and a decrease in five-to-four decisions.  It 
is revealing, however, that the new Chief Justice participated in all four of 
the term’s significant, non-unanimous death penalty cases and that three of 
the four were decided to the detriment of death-row petitioners.  A fourth 
decision, House v. Bell,127 resulted in a victory for a death-row inmate, but 
did little to advance the cause of fairness in capital cases.  In House, the 
Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit ruling that barred a Tennessee 
prisoner from pursuing an appeal of his conviction and death sentence.  
Paul Gregory House had been sentenced to die for the murder of Carolyn 
Muncey, a neighbor who was found beaten to death approximately 100 
yards from the home she shared with her husband.128  House appealed to 
the state courts, alleging jury-instruction errors and arguing that he had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.129  After the Tennessee 
courts rejected all of House’s appeals and petitions for post-conviction 
relief, he filed a final state post-conviction petition seeking investigative 
and/or expert assistance to help him reassert his claims.130  The Tennessee 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that any new claims by House were barred 
under a state law stipulating that claims not brought in prior post-
conviction petitions are presumptively waived.131 
House next sought habeas corpus relief in federal court and this time 
he cited newly discovered evidence including DNA test results proving 
that semen found on the victim’s nightgown belonged to Mrs. Munsey’s 
husband and not, as claimed by trial prosecutors, to House.132  Despite the 
new evidence, the trial court and the Sixth Circuit, meeting en banc, denied 
federal habeas review under the rule that federal courts will not consider 
claims that have been procedurally defaulted under state law unless the 
petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice from the 
  
 126. See id.  
 127. 126 S. Ct. 2064 (2006). 
 128. Id. at 2068–72. 
 129. Id. at 2075. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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errors asserted in his petition.133  House and his attorneys argued that 
House’s case fell under the miscarriage-of-justice exception to the cause-
and-prejudice standard134—an exception established by the Supreme Court 
in Schlup v. Delo135 that permits a petitioner to pursue an otherwise proce-
durally defaulted claim if he can show that “it is more likely than not that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evi-
dence.”136  By an eight-to-seven vote the Sixth Circuit ruled that House’s 
claims were not compelling enough to be considered under the miscar-
riage-of-justice standard.137 
House v. Bell gave the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity not 
only to widen the scope of the Schlup miscarriage-of-justice standard but 
to clear away the confusion that surrounds another possible gateway to 
federal habeas review in otherwise defaulted capital cases involving claims 
of innocence.  In Herrera v. Collins,138 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a 
puzzling majority opinion that asserted that a death-sentenced prisoner 
cannot obtain federal habeas relief solely on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence of “actual innocence” when he has no accompanying claim 
of a violation of his constitutional rights.139  However, in response to the 
  
 133. Id. at 2075–76.  The “cause and prejudice” rule was created by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982); Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).  
 134. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075–76. 
 135. 513 U.S. 298 (1995). 
 136. Id. at 327. 
 137. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2076. 
 138. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).   
 139. Id. at 398–402 (citing such cases as Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1923)) (“What we 
have to deal with [in habeas cases] is not the petitioners’ innocence or guilt but solely the question 
whether their constitutional rights have been preserved”).  Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that histori-
cally the primary purpose of federal habeas review has been to ensure that lower courts did not violate 
a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights, not to evaluate new evidence of innocence.  Id. at 400–01.  
He also stressed that the historic remedy—and an effective one—for saving factually innocent but 
wrongfully convicted people from an undeserved punishment is executive clemency.  See id. at 411–17.  
“[H]istory is replete with examples of wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in the 
wake of after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence.”  Id. at 415.  In dissent, Justice Black-
mun countered that although clemency proceedings sometimes saved the lives of erroneously convicted 
defendants, executive clemency, at best, was an ad hoc exercise of authority by governors and other 
elected officials that was highly fallible and, in fact, had failed to save the lives of a number of factually 
innocent people.  Id. at 430 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
  Five years later, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), the Court 
ruled on the question of whether death-sentenced prisoners are entitled to any Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment due process protection in the clemency process.  The Court held that the procedures fol-
lowed by Ohio’s Adult Parole Authority in capital cases, though so minimal that neither the prisoner 
nor his attorney were entitled to testify or to present evidence during the clemency hearing, were suffi-
cient to satisfy the due process clause.  See id. at 275–88.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, 
stressing that clemency hearings are the province of the executive branch of government, have not 
historically been the business of courts, and would seldom, if ever, be appropriate subjects for judicial 
review.  Id. at 275–85.  He also joined with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy in asserting that due 
process protections are not constitutionally required in capital clemency proceedings.  Id. at 283–85.  
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question of whether the execution of a factually innocent person violates 
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, Rehnquist, without clearly answer-
ing the question, wrote: 
We may assume for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that 
in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual inno-
cence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant 
unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no 
state avenue open to process such a claim.140 
He added that even in such a hypothetical case, “the threshold showing for 
such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.”141 
House’s petition for certiorari in House v. Bell argued that his newly 
discovered evidence satisfied both the Schlup miscarriage-of-justice stan-
dard and the Herrera actual innocence standard.142  Writing for a five-
justice majority that included Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, Justice Kennedy announced that by the narrowest of margins 
House had met the “stringent showing” required by the miscarriage-of-
justice standard.143  Justice Kennedy emphasized that “it bears repeating 
that the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the ‘ex-
traordinary’ case.”144  Justice Kennedy offered a detailed review of the new 
evidence145 and concluded that “although the issue is close . . . this is the 
rare case where—had the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole 
  
Clemency is a privilege, he proclaimed, not a right: “If clemency is granted, [a death-sentenced inmate] 
obtains a benefit; if it is denied, he is no worse off than he was before.”  Id. at 285.  Justice O’Connor, 
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, did not go that far, but she agreed that Ohio’s clem-
ency procedures were constitutionally adequate.  Id. at 288–90 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter, contending that the Rehnquist 
opinion would permit clemency procedures to be infected by “the deliberate fabrication of false evi-
dence” and that the O’Connor opinion provided “minimal, perhaps even barely perceptible” procedural 
safeguards for condemned inmates.  Id. at 290–91.  Justice Blackmun almost certainly would have 
dissented in Woodard, but he resigned from the Court in June 2004, shortly after declaring that he had 
come to the conclusion that capital punishment simply cannot be administered in a constitutionally 
acceptable manner and that he would “no longer . . . tinker with the machinery of death.”  Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 140. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 
 141. Id.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that there can be no doubt that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of an innocent person and concluded that “[t]he 
execution of a person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder.”  Id. 
at 446. 
 142. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2075–76. 
 143. Id. at 2068. 
 144. Id. at 2077. 
 145. See id. at 2068–75, 2078–86. 
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would lack reasonable doubt.”146  House thus would be allowed to pursue 
his federal habeas petition.147 
This undoubtedly was good news for House and his attorneys.  But 
Justice Kennedy’s extended analysis of the factual evidence raises more 
questions than it answers with regard to the scope of the miscarriage-of-
justice standard and does little to help other death-sentenced inmates in 
similar situations.  Must the Supreme Court turn itself into a trial jury and 
plunge into the details of every case in which new evidence is discovered?  
Capital defendants and the processes of post-conviction justice would be 
better served by the articulation of a clear set of criteria that would permit 
capital defendants to pursue otherwise procedurally defaulted appeals 
whenever new evidence suggests that there is a reasonable possibility that 
the defendant is innocent. 
With respect to the opportunity to clear away the confusion surround-
ing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seemingly contradictory assertions in 
Herrera v. Collins, the House majority succeeded only in adding to the 
confusion.  Justice Kennedy contended that the Herrera decision merely 
“assumed without deciding” that a death-sentenced petitioner has a sub-
stantive right under the Eighth Amendment to seek federal habeas relief 
when he makes a “truly persuasive” demonstration of innocence after all 
state avenues to his claim have been closed.148  The question of whether 
such a right truly exists, however, remains unresolved because Herrera’s 
factual claims were far from credible.149  Justice Kennedy conceded that 
House’s claims were much stronger than those asserted by Herrera—strong 
enough, in fact, to satisfy the procedural gateway to federal habeas review 
established by Schlup v. Delo.150  Nevertheless, House’s claims, in the ma-
jority’s view, were not quite strong enough to convince the Court to decide 
whether there actually is a Herrera right to seek federal relief for petition-
ers who have defaulted their state claims but have made a “truly persua-
sive” case of innocence.151  Justice Kennedy concluded that “whatever 
burden a hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require, this 
petitioner has not satisfied it.”152  Thus, over a decade after Herrera, the 
Supreme Court has failed to make it clear whether the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the execution of innocent people, whether federal courts can hear 
an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim of actual innocence based on 
  
 146. Id. at 2086. 
 147. Id. at 2087. 
 148. Id. at 2086. 
 149. Id. at 2086–87. 
 150. Id. at 2087. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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newly discovered evidence, and, if so, what standards are to be used to 
determine whether a claim of innocence is “truly persuasive.” 
The House decision exemplifies a pattern of jurisprudence that has be-
come increasingly evident since the beginning of the Court’s 2005–2006 
term, the first under the stewardship of Chief Justice Roberts.  When capi-
tal defendants are on the winning side, the majority opinion is mired in 
factual analysis and is narrowly fashioned so as to apply only to the instant 
petitioner.  The Court refuses to clarify murky standards or to broaden ex-
isting criteria, even marginally, in a way that would ensure due process and 
fundamental fairness in capital trials and remove procedural obstacles to 
full and fair appellate review of capital convictions and sentences. 
More often than not, moreover, death-row petitioners have found 
themselves on the losing side in significant cases involving interpretation 
of constitutional, statutory, and procedural guidelines.  Justice Alito had 
not yet been confirmed when the House oral arguments were held and he 
did not participate in the decision.  It is noteworthy, however, that Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, issued an opinion 
concurring with the majority’s refusal to pursue House’s Herrera claim, 
“assuming such a claim exists,” and dissenting from the finding that the 
new evidence of innocence was sufficient to permit further federal habeas 
review.153 
Three major cases from the Court’s 2005–2006 docket upheld death 
sentences imposed under procedural rules that clearly tip the scales of jus-
tice against capital defendants.  In Brown v. Sanders,154 Justice Scalia, 
joined by Justice O’Connor, serving her last month on the Court, as well as 
by Chief Justice Roberts and by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, authored 
the Court’s most expansive decision yet on the issue of upholding death 
sentences procured, in part, on the basis of unauthorized or invalid aggra-
vating circumstances.155  Brown held that a jury’s consideration of two 
  
 153. See id. at 2087–96 (Roberts, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 154. 546 U.S. 212 (2006). 
 155. Since 1983, the Court generally has held that an appellate court’s finding that one of several 
aggravating factors cited by the sentencer to justify a death sentence was invalid does not necessarily 
invalidate the death sentence.  In “weighing states,” states that allow sentencing juries to consider only 
aggravating factors that bear on the defendant’s eligibility for capital punishment in the first place, the 
jury’s consideration of an invalid eligibility factor requires reversal of a death sentence unless the 
state’s appellate courts determine the error to be harmless or reweigh the remaining aggravating evi-
dence and find it to outweigh the mitigating evidence.  See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 
(1991).  In “non-weighing states,” states that permit sentencing juries to consider aggravating factors 
different from, or in addition to, the eligibility factors used to find the defendant eligible for capital 
punishment in the first place, the jury’s consideration of an invalid eligibility factor requires reversal of 
a death sentence if the jury’s consideration of the invalid eligibility factor led it to hear evidence that 
was not otherwise before the jury or if the reason for the invalidity of the aggravating factor is that it 
led the jury to draw adverse inferences from constitutionally protected conduct or to consider aggravat-
ing evidence that was irrelevant, constitutionally impermissible, or more appropriately viewed as miti-
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invalid aggravating factors will not make a death sentence unconstitutional 
if appellate courts determine that the facts supporting those factors also 
tend to support at least one valid aggravating factor.156 
In Oregon v. Guzek,157 a case decided after Justice O’Connor’s retire-
ment and in which Justice Alito did not participate, the Court vacated an 
Oregon Supreme Court holding that a capital defendant, as a matter of fed-
eral law, should be allowed to present alibi evidence at his upcoming sen-
tencing hearing, even if that evidence was inconsistent with his conviction.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer disputed the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s plurality and concurring opin-
ions in Franklin v. Lynaugh.158  Justice Breyer said that the Oregon court 
had mischaracterized Franklin as permitting a convicted capital defendant 
to introduce at the sentencing stage evidence intended to cast residual 
doubt on his guilt.159  Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Franklin Court 
discussed the question of whether capital defendants might have such a 
right, but he argued that the Court did not resolve the issue.160 
Moreover, the Court refused to address this issue in Guzek’s case.161  
Justice Breyer contended that this was because even if capital defendants 
had the right to offer evidence designed to thwart the imposition of a death 
sentence based on the jury’s lingering doubts about guilt, it would not ex-
tend so far as to permit Guzek to introduce alibi evidence that he was not 
present at the crime scene.162  “The law typically discourages collateral 
attacks of this kind,” and even though capital defendants are entitled under 
the Eighth Amendment to present mitigating evidence about their character 
or record or the circumstances of the crime, they are traditionally limited to 
the question of how, not whether, the defendant committed the crime.163 
  
gating evidence.  See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).  See generally RANDALL COYNE & 
LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 415–29 (3d ed. 2006).  
 156. Brown, 546 U.S. at 219–25.  Justice Scalia suggested that the Court would be better served by 
dropping the weighing/non-weighing distinction and adopting the following rule:   
An invalidated sentencing factor (whether an eligibility factor or not) will render the sen-
tence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale 
in the weighing process unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to 
give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances. 
Id. at 220 (footnote omitted).  
 157. 546 U.S. 517 (2006). 
 158. Id. at 525.  In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988), the Court rejected a death-sentenced 
petitioner’s contention that the trial judge violated his Eighth Amendment right to present all relevant 
mitigating evidence by refusing to instruct the jurors that any evidence they considered to militate 
against the death penalty could be enough, in and of itself, to justify voting against the imposition of a 
death sentence. 
 159. Guzek, 546 U.S. at 525. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 525–26 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 526. 
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It is noteworthy that this decision was unanimous.  Not a single Justice 
pointed out that twenty years earlier, Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion 
in Lockhart v. McCree,164 a case raising the question of whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires two juries in capital cases—a jury composed of all 
eligible jurors for the guilt-adjudication stage and a death-qualified jury for 
the penalty stage—answered that question in the negative and stressed that 
one of the benefits of the unitary capital jury is that “the defendant might 
benefit at the sentencing phase of the trial from the jury’s ‘residual doubts’ 
about the evidence presented at the guilt phase.”165  Not surprisingly, Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s Lockhart argument was not mentioned in Justice Scalia’s 
Guzek concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas, and la-
mented Justice Breyer’s failure “to put to rest, once and for all, the mis-
taken notion that the Eighth Amendment requires that a convicted capital 
defendant be given the opportunity, at his sentencing hearing, to present 
evidence and argument concerning residual doubts about his guilt.”166 
Later in the term, Justice Thomas, joined by the newly appointed Jus-
tice Alito and by Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy, wrote the majority 
opinion in Kansas v. Marsh,167 holding that a Kansas law that requires the 
  
 164. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).  At issue in Lockhart was the constitutionality of “death qualification”—
the removal for cause, prior to the guilt-adjudication stage of a capital trial, of all prospective jurors 
whose opposition to capital punishment is strong enough to prevent or substantially impair their will-
ingness to impose the death sentence at the penalty stage of the trial.  Id. at 165–67.  McCree’s attor-
neys presented numerous social-science studies showing that death-qualified juries are more likely to 
convict defendants in the guilt-adjudication stage than are juries on which death penalty opponents are 
permitted to serve.  Id. at 167–73.  They argued that the scientific evidence proved that death qualifica-
tion produces capital juries that are more “conviction prone” than are ordinary petit juries that decide 
between guilt and innocence in non-capital trials, and that capital defendants therefore are deprived of 
their Sixth Amendment rights to trial by an impartial jury and to trial before a jury drawn from a fair 
cross-section of the community.  Id.  The remedy would be two juries in capital cases—one for the 
guilt-adjudication stage from which potential jurors with qualms about capital punishment have not 
been excluded for that reason alone and a second, death-qualified, jury that could fairly evaluate the 
prosecutor’s arguments for imposing the death penalty as well as defense counsel’s arguments against 
imposing it.  See id. at 198–206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion as-
sumed for the purpose of reaching the constitutional issues that the studies were methodologically valid 
and established that death-qualified juries were more conviction prone than were ordinary trial juries.  
Id. at 173.  The majority nevertheless repudiated both Sixth Amendment arguments, stressing that 
“exactly the same 12 individuals could have ended up on [McCree’s] jury through the ‘luck of the 
draw,’ without in any way violating the constitutional guarantee of impartiality” and that the Court’s 
prior cases on the impermissible exclusion of jurors applied only to jurors excluded on the basis of 
some immutable characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, or gender—not to people who are excluded “on 
the basis of an attribute that is within the individual’s control.”  Id. at 176–78.  See generally Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court’s Response to Empirical Research on Capital Pun-
ishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 177–211 
(Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988). 
 165. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 181. 
 166. Guzek, 546 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 167. 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).  Justice Alito’s first written opinion was announced on May 1, 2006 in a 
death penalty case that precipitated no conflict among the Justices.  In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 
U.S. 319 (2006), Justice Alito authored a brief unanimous opinion ordering a new trial for a death-row 
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jury to return a death sentence when the jury found the aggravating and 
mitigating factors to be equally balanced did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.168  Although this law clearly had a mandatory element,169 the 
majority reasoned that it was not a Woodson-type full-fledged mandatory 
punishment law because it satisfied the constitutional mandates of Furman 
and Gregg by giving the jury the discretion to consider and weigh the sig-
nificance of relevant mitigating evidence.170  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Stevens, and Souter joined in dissent, with Justice Souter arguing that the 
constitutional provision against cruel and unusual punishment should be 
understood to disallow a “doubtful” death sentence when aggravating and 
mitigating factors are of equal weight, especially in light of recent years in 
which we have seen “repeated exonerations of convicts under death sen-
tences, in numbers never imagined before the development of DNA 
tests.”171 
C. The Supreme Court’s 2006–2007 Term Death Penalty Decisions 
The Court’s 2006–2007 term saw a continuation of the pattern by 
which the most important death penalty cases are decided in favor of the 
state and against petitioning prisoners, with Justices Roberts, Alito, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy prevailing over Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, 
and Souter.  That Chief Justice Roberts has been consistently voting to 
uphold death penalty laws may be somewhat surprising to some Court-
watchers, but Justice Alito’s consistently pro-capital punishment positions 
so far have surprised no one.  As a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, Alito earned a reputation as a reliably conservative voice 
and, as was widely reported, some attorneys jokingly referred to him as 
“Scalito.”172  During his Senate confirmation hearings, Alito’s supporters 
denied that Alito would be “Scalia’s clone,” and he was confirmed by a 
fifty-eight to forty-two vote.173  It would be simplistic to claim that Alito 
sees law and his role as a Justice in the same way as Scalia or any other 
Justice, past or present.  But Alito overwhelmingly voted against criminal 
  
inmate who was not permitted to present exculpatory evidence that another man committed the crime 
because of a South Carolina law that bars such evidence when the state has introduced strong forensic 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt.  See id. at 321–31.  All nine Justices agreed that the rule was arbitrary 
and irrational and violated the defendant’s due process right to present a meaningful defense.  See id. at 
325–31. 
 168. See Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2520–29. 
 169. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 170. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2524–26. 
 171. Id. at 2544 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 172. See GREENBURG, supra note 124 at 290–97. 
 173. TOOBIN, supra note 124 at 315–16. 
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defendants as a federal judge,174 and his pro-capital punishment votes 
proved critical during the 2006–2007 term.  There is little doubt that he 
will vote to uphold death penalty laws more consistently than did Justice 
O’Connor. 
The Court’s death penalty jurisprudence in the 2006–2007 term sug-
gests that there will be few, if any, Atkins- or Roper-like holdings over the 
next several years.  Nine death penalty holdings were announced and eight 
were decided by a vote of five-to-four.  Justice Kennedy was the “swing” 
vote in each of these cases, joining Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and 
Souter in four decisions in favor of death-row litigants and joining Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas in four decisions 
that rejected constitutional challenges to death penalty laws or procedures.  
The latter decisions, however, involved especially critical questions about 
the fairness of trial and appellate death penalty procedures, and the out-
comes demonstrate a greater willingness than was seen in the 2002–2005 
period to side with prosecutors and to overlook errors by defense attorneys 
in capital cases.  The Court’s 2006–2007 term death penalty jurisprudence 
also points to the pivotal role that Justice Kennedy now plays as well as to 
the difference that Justice Alito’s presence on the Court will make in capi-
tal cases (and in many other areas of law) in the years to come. 
The only case, strictly speaking, that was not decided by a five-to-four 
vote was Roper v. Weaver.175  Even though a five-justice majority simply 
dismissed the case without deciding its merits, the dismissal provoked dis-
agreement from Chief Justice Roberts and a strongly worded dissent from 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.  The question was whether a federal 
court of appeals had exceeded its authority under the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) when it invalidated a death 
sentence on the ground that the prosecutor’s closing argument was unfairly 
inflammatory. 
The AEDPA bars federal habeas courts from reversing state criminal 
convictions or sentences absent a finding that the state court’s decision 
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”176  This inherently vague admonition has proved troublesome for 
federal courts.  The line between “contrary to” and “unreasonable applica-
tion of” is blurry, and the statute provides no guidance with regard to the 
level of specificity by which to judge whether Supreme Court interpreta-
  
 174. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Privacy Ruling Likely Will Hinge on Alito, WASH. POST, May 19, 2006, 
at A11. 
 175. 127 S. Ct. 2022 (2007). 
 176. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
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tions of federal law are “clearly established.”177  Since 2000, however, the 
Supreme Court generally has taken the position that an incorrect applica-
tion of state law is not necessarily an “unreasonable” application of 
“clearly established” federal law and that clearly established federal law 
refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions . . 
. .”178 
In Carey v. Musladin,179 for example, the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit 
panel’s reversal of a California Court of Appeals ruling that a criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was not violated when a 
judge, presiding over a murder trial, permitted an alleged murder victim’s 
family members to sit in the front row of the courtroom spectator’s gallery 
while wearing buttons displaying the alleged victim’s picture.180  Writing 
for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas acknowledged that criminal defen-
dants have a clearly established right to a fair trial and that it was not un-
reasonable for the Ninth Circuit to conclude that in this instance the wear-
ing of the buttons was so prejudicial that it violated the defendant’s fair-
trial rights.181  However, even though the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutional right to a fair trial many times, the Court has never decided a 
case raising the specific question of whether “such private-actor courtroom 
conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair 
trial.”182  Thus, the federal appeals court erred by finding that permitting 
the spectators to wear the buttons was contrary to clearly established fed-
eral law, and the state rulings denying the defendant’s claim and upholding 
his conviction must prevail.183 
In Roper v. Weaver, Missouri prosecutors argued that an Eighth Circuit 
panel had committed a similar error by ruling that the Missouri Supreme 
Court had erroneously applied clearly established federal law when it up-
held a death sentence despite inflammatory and improper statements made 
by the prosecutor in his sentencing-stage closing argument.184  The state 
court found that the prosecutor’s comments were not so outrageous and 
prejudicial that any reasonable trial judge would have declared a mistrial 
on due process grounds.185  The federal court disagreed, citing several spe-
cific types of prosecutorial statements including the prosecutor’s claim that 
executing the defendant was necessary to win the “war on drugs,” an anal-
  
 177. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374–90 (2000). 
 178. Id. at 412 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 179. 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006). 
 180. Id. at 651–53. 
 181. Id. at 653–54. 
 182. Id. at 653. 
 183. Id. at 654. 
 184. Roper, 127 S. Ct. at 2023–24. 
 185. See State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1995). 
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ogy liking the role of a juror to the role of a soldier who must do his or her 
duty and have the courage to kill, and an emotional appeal to the jury to 
“kill [the defendant] now.”186  Such statements, the court declared, violate 
longstanding Supreme Court admonitions against closing statements that 
offend the principle of due process as well as Eighth Amendment prece-
dents that require capital sentencing to be an individualized decision based 
on the character of the defendant and the particular circumstances of the 
crime.187 
The state countered by asking the Supreme Court to find that the fed-
eral tribunal exceeded its authority under the AEDPA in that the prosecu-
tor’s statements were factually unique and never had been precisely ad-
dressed in any of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the constitutional 
boundaries of prosecutors’ closing arguments.188  The Supreme Court, 
however, found that the state’s petition for review was improvidently 
granted and dismissed the case, thus leaving intact the Eighth Circuit’s 
reversal of the death sentence.189  After examining the procedural history of 
the case, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Kennedy joined 
in a brief per curiam opinion that took note of the fact that Weaver actually 
filed his petition for habeas corpus before the AEDPA took effect and it 
reached the court of appeals after AEDPA’s effective date only because the 
trial court had erroneously dismissed it as premature.190  Because two other 
capital cases filed in the same jurisdiction had raised the same issue—
unduly inflammatory closing statements by prosecutors—and had been 
correctly dismissed as pre-AEDPA cases, the majority believed that it 
would be unfair to decide Weaver’s case under the stringent standards of 
the AEDPA.191  A dismissal was necessary, the majority explained “to pre-
vent these three virtually identically situated litigants from being treated in 
a needlessly disparate manner.”192 
Chief Justice Roberts responded with a cryptic, one-sentence concur-
rence noting that while he was willing to go along with the dismissal, he 
did not agree with all of the reasons given by the majority.193  By contrast, 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, characterized the ma-
jority’s action as having “no justification,” “quite wrong,” “wasteful,” and 
“particularly perverse.”194  The error made by the trial judge, he argued, 
  
 186. See Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F.3d 832, 835–37 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 187. Id. at 839–42. 
 188. Roper, 127 S. Ct. at 2022–23. 
 189. Id. at 2022–24. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 2024. 
 193. Id. (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 194. Id. at 2024–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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“does not affect the legal conclusion that AEDPA applies to [this case],”195 
and the result was that a “grossly erroneous” interpretation of the AEDPA 
that works to the disadvantage of prosecutors remains in effect.196 
The four cases from the 2006–2007 term that resulted in fully decided 
victories for death-row inmates came from Texas, and three were an-
nounced on the same day, April 25, 2007.  Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,197 
Brewer v. Quarterman,198 and Smith v. Texas 199 dealt with an idiosyncratic 
aspect of Texas death penalty law that is no longer in effect.  In 1989, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the jury instructions then used in Texas capital 
cases were constitutionally deficient because they could not ensure that 
jurors would give full consideration to a defendant’s mitigating evi-
dence.200  Jurors had been told to address only three questions—whether 
the murder was deliberate, whether the defendant was likely to commit 
future acts of violence, and whether the defendant’s conduct in killing the 
victim was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the vic-
tim—and if all three answers were “yes,” a death sentence was auto-
matic.201  The Texas legislature in 1991 addressed the problem by instruct-
ing judges to tell jurors to take “all of the evidence” into consideration,202 
but in the intervening two-year period, many judges either took no correc-
tive measures or measures that the Supreme Court eventually found to be 
inadequate.203 
Abdul-Katir, Brewer, and Smith were tried and sentenced to death dur-
ing this period and appealed their death sentences.  However, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to grant habeas corpus hear-
ings to Abdul-Kabir or to Brewer on the ground that the law pertaining to 
proper jury instructions in Texas was muddled and confusing at the time of 
their trials and thus their death sentences were not obtained on the basis of 
“an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law” as required 
by the AEDPA.204  Smith’s appeals were rejected by the Texas Court of 
  
 195. Id. at 2024. 
 196. Id. at 2027. 
 197. 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007). 
 198. 127 S. Ct. 1706 (2007). 
 199. 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007). 
 200. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 315–28 (1989).   
 201. See id. at 322–26.  
 202. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) (Vernon 2006). 
 203. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (holding that a jury must be adequately given the 
opportunity to give effect to mitigating evidence and rejecting as inadequate the Texas supplemental 
“nullification instruction” that directed jurors to consider mitigating evidence, but permitted jurors to 
do so only by somehow negating or ignoring what may have been their death-sentence-supportive 
affirmative responses to statutorily required special questions about the defendant’s mens rea and his 
future dangerousness).  The Supreme Court reiterated this holding in Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 
(2004) (per curiam), aff’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007). 
 204. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1662–64; Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1709–11. 
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Criminal Appeals on the ground that there was little likelihood that the jury 
had failed to consider the mitigating evidence and thus the inadequate jury 
instructions amounted to a “harmless error” that was not subject to state 
post-conviction review.205 
In all three cases, the majority held that the lower courts had miscon-
strued longstanding, well-established, and clearly articulated Supreme 
Court decisions and had misapplied the procedural rules invoked to uphold 
the death sentences.  Justice Stevens wrote for the Court in Abdul-Kabir 
and in Brewer, and he rebuked the Fifth Circuit for “ignoring the funda-
mental principles established by our most relevant precedents,”206 and for 
failing to “heed the warnings that have repeatedly issued from this Court” 
that the jury must be allowed to fully consider all relevant mitigating evi-
dence “in its calculus of deciding whether a defendant is truly deserving of 
death.”207  Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Smith v. 
Texas, explaining that he agreed with the other majority Justices that the 
Texas court erred in finding that it was unlikely that Smith’s jury had not 
considered the mitigating evidence and that the inadequate jury instruc-
tions could not be considered to be harmless.208  The dissenting Justices in 
these cases expressed strong disagreement with the majority’s approach, 
with Chief Justice Roberts accusing the majority of taking an “utterly revi-
sionist” view of the Court’s mitigating-factors jurisprudence and giving the 
Court “far too much credit in claiming that our sharply divided, ebbing and 
flowing decisions in this area [of law] gave rise to ‘clearly established’ 
federal law.”209 
Abdul-Kabir, Brewer, and Smith cannot realistically be regarded as 
major victories for those who are opposed to capital punishment or for 
those, pro- or con-capital punishment, who are concerned that capital pun-
ishment is not always imposed in a fair, reliable, and constitutionally ap-
propriate manner.  It can only be worrisome and disconcerting that the 
Court reaffirmed only by the narrowest of margins jury-instruction princi-
ples that it has consistently and clearly articulated since 1989.210 
Late in the term, the Court announced its decision in a case that was 
closely watched by death penalty foes.  In Panetti v. Quarterman,211 the 
Court forestalled the execution of a mentally ill inmate in Texas.  How-
ever, the holding did not go nearly as far as opponents of capital punish-
  
 205. Smith, 127 S. Ct. at 1694–96. 
 206. Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1671. 
 207. Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1714. 
 208. Smith, 127 S. Ct. at 1697–99. 
 209. Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1715 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 210. See supra notes 200–203 and accompanying text. 
 211. 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). 
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ment had hoped.  In 1986, the Court in Ford v. Wainwright212 held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not permit the execution of prisoners who are 
insane at the time of their pending execution and that such inmates cannot 
be executed unless and until their sanity is restored.213  However, the stan-
dard to be used in determining whether an inmate suffers from mental ill-
ness to a sufficient degree to warrant postponing his execution was left 
vague and was not laid out beyond Justice Powell’s concurring opinion 
that “the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are 
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to 
suffer it.”214 
Critics of capital punishment hoped that the Panetti case would lead to 
a clear definition of insanity that would block executions when there was 
evidence of substantial mental illness, even in cases where the inmate 
seems to comprehend the reality of his death sentence.  But, writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy declined to define a new standard for determin-
ing a prisoner’s competency to be executed.  He found, however, that the 
Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit employed an overly restrictive standard 
in determining that Scott Panetti was sane enough to execute.  Panetti had 
been found to be a schizophrenic by doctors both before and after his 1995 
trial for killing his wife’s parents.215  Court-ordered psychiatric evaluations 
disclosed that Panetti suffered from “a fragmented personality, delusions, 
and hallucinations,” and evaluations done after his trial indicated that his 
condition had only worsened.216  Nevertheless, in response to Panetti’s 
petition to postpone his scheduled execution, court-appointed experts in 
2004 concluded that he “knows that he is to be executed, and that his exe-
cution will result in his death.”217  The Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit 
subsequently ruled that Panetti had a minimal understanding of the fact of 
his impending execution and the reason for it and that that was enough to 
go forward with the execution.218 
The Panetti majority rejected the standard used by the lower courts as 
too restrictive to satisfy the standard required by Ford v. Wainwright.  Jus-
tice Kennedy conceded that Ford “did not set forth a precise standard for 
  
 212. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  For a well-researched history of the compelling but in some ways all too 
common circumstances surrounding the case of Florida death-row inmate Alvin Ford, see KENT S. 
MILLER & MICHAEL L. RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
AND THE CASE OF ALVIN FORD (1993). 
 213. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401–18. 
 214. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 215. Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2848–49. 
 216. Id. at 2848.  
 217. Id. at 2851.   
 218. Id. at 2851–52, 2859–60. 
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competency.”219  Nevertheless, the minimal standard employed by the Fifth 
Circuit—whether a prisoner is aware “that he is going to be executed and 
why he is going to be executed”—was too simplistic in that it did not allow 
decision makers to consider the evidence that Panetti “suffers from a se-
vere, documented mental illness that is the source of gross delusions pre-
venting him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punish-
ment to which he has been sentenced.”220  “Gross delusions stemming from 
a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime 
and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the pun-
ishment can serve no proper purpose.”221 
Declaring that the records in Panetti’s case were not informative 
enough to permit the majority to articulate a clear standard for determining 
competency for execution, Justice Kennedy remanded the case to the fed-
eral trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opin-
ion.222  Justice Thomas wrote for the dissenting Justices and argued that the 
majority had erred procedurally and that under the AEDPA and its own 
precedents, the Court should not have accepted Panetti’s case for review.223  
But having done so, according to Justice Thomas, the majority succeeded 
only in misconstruing Ford and producing “a half-baked holding that 
leaves the details of the insanity standard for the District Court to work 
out.”224 
The four cases in which the Court voted to uphold state laws and pro-
cedures that led to death sentences, like the four Texas cases, confirm that 
the Justices are bitterly divided on death penalty issues.  These decisions 
also indicate that in the cases that matter the most, Justice Kennedy is 
likely to join with the four Justices who consistently vote to endorse death 
sentences.  Indeed, in the first death penalty case to be decided in the 
2006–2007 term—Ayers v. Belmontes225—Justice Kennedy delivered the 
majority opinion upholding a death sentence imposed by confused jurors 
who were told by the prosecutor to ignore constitutionally relevant mitigat-
ing evidence.  In Belmontes, the Court considered whether California’s 
death-sentencing scheme had misled a capital-sentencing jury into believ-
ing that they were not permitted to consider “forward-looking” mitigating 
evidence introduced by the defendant.226  The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that mitigating evidence of a defendant’s good behavior in prison and 
  
 219. Id. at 2860. 
 220. Id. at 2860–62. 
 221. Id. at 2862. 
 222. Id. at 2862–63. 
 223. See id. at 2863–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 2873. 
 225. 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006). 
 226. Id. at 472–73. 
File: Haas - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3 Created on: 3/5/2008 9:28:00 PM Last Printed: 3/10/2008 10:16:00 PM 
2008 THE ROBERTS COURT 421 
 
the likelihood that he will be non-violent and make positive contributions 
if sentenced to life imprisonment must be considered by a capital jury.227  
California’s death penalty law, however, asks capital jurors to consider a 
set of general “special factors” rather than circumstances that are specifi-
cally labeled as “aggravating” or “mitigating,” and this has led to concerns 
that the inherent vagueness of the special circumstances often befuddles 
jurors, leading them to ignore pertinent mitigating evidence.228 
Belmonte’s attorneys complained that none of the special circum-
stances made it clear to the jurors that they were to take his prior good 
prison behavior and his religious beliefs into account.229  They also argued 
that one of the factors that the jury was asked to consider—“any other cir-
cumstance which extenuated the gravity of the crime even though it is not 
a legal excuse for the crime”—increased the likelihood that jurors would 
think that they could not consider the evidence showing that Belmontes 
would lead a constructive life if incarcerated rather than executed.230  In his 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy conceded that the future-prison-conduct 
evidence was central to the defense’s case against a death sentence.231  
Nevertheless, based on a review of the trial record, the majority concluded 
that it was “implausible” that the jurors would have thought that they were 
foreclosed from considering the mitigating evidence.232  According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, any harm to the defense’s case was mitigated because the 
trial judge told the jury to consider “all of the evidence.”233  Since this ad-
monition presumably included the forward-looking evidence, there was no 
reason to reverse the death sentence.234 
Justice Stevens wrote for the dissenting Justices and reached a very 
different conclusion after examining the trial record.  He stressed that the 
prosecutor told the jurors that he doubted that they should consider the 
evidence of the defendant’s religious experiences at all; that the trial 
judge’s instructions, taken as a whole, would have led a reasonable juror to 
think that he could not consider the prison-conduct evidence under the 
“gravity of the crime” factor; and that during deliberations the jurors asked 
numerous questions about this evidence, none of which the judge answered 
  
 227. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires 
the admission of mitigating evidence that a capital defendant has behaved well when in prison and can 
be expected to continue to do so if sentenced to lengthy imprisonment rather than to death). 
 228. See Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. at 473–75. 
 229. Id. at 472–73. 
 230. See id. at 473–77. 
 231. Id. at 476. 
 232. Id. at 477–78. 
 233. Id. at 477–79. 
 234. Id. at 478–80. 
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in a way that would eliminate “their obvious confusion.”235  “I simply can-
not believe that the jurors took it upon themselves to consider testimony 
they were all but told they were forbidden from considering.”236  At the 
very least, he concluded, the jurors were confused as to whether they could 
take the mitigating evidence into account, and this kind of confusion cre-
ated “a risk of error sufficient to warrant relief for a man who has spent 
more than half his life on death row.”237 
In Lawrence v. Florida,238 the Court tackled an important procedural 
question requiring the Justices again to decide the extent to which the 
AEDPA circumscribes prisoners’ ability to bring a federal habeas corpus 
petition challenging their convictions or death sentences.  The AEDPA 
established a one-year deadline for state prisoners to file a federal habeas 
petition for review of a state judgment,239 and the one-year period is tolled 
while the inmate’s state post-conviction appeals are “pending.”240  Law-
rence filed a petition against his death sentence 113 days after the Florida 
Supreme Court ruled against his state appeal, but he claimed that he did so 
because he and his attorney believed that the tolling period did not begin 
until his petition for certiorari—his concurrent appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court—had been denied and that his petition for certiorari was still pend-
ing when he filed his federal habeas petition.241 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas quoted the applicable provi-
sion of the AEDPA: “The time during which a properly filed application 
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the per-
tinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period 
of limitation under this subsection.”242  This language, according to Justice 
Thomas required a strict interpretation: “Read naturally, the text of the 
statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled only while state 
courts review the application.”243  The U.S. Supreme Court, he explained, 
is a federal court, not a state court, and thus does not participate in the 
state’s post-conviction procedures.244  The tolling period began when the 
Florida Supreme Court denied relief, and the fact that Lawrence’s separate 
certiorari petition was still pending before a federal court was irrelevant.245 
  
 235. See id. at 483–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 236. Id. at 492. 
 237. Id. 
 238. 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007). 
 239. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
 240. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 
 241. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1081–83. 
 242. Id. at 1082 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). 
 243. Id. at 1083. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1083–85. 
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Lawrence also argued that his lawyer’s mistake should entitle him to 
equitable tolling.246  Justice Thomas, however, expressed concern that ac-
cepting this argument could lead to extending the toll-limitations period 
“for every person whose attorney missed a deadline.”247  He added that 
miscalculations by attorneys are “simply not sufficient to warrant equitable 
tolling, particularly in the post-conviction context where prisoners have no 
constitutional right to counsel.”248  The federal courts thus were precluded 
from considering Lawrence’s habeas petition to vacate his death sen-
tence.249 
Writing for the dissenting Justices, Justice Ginsburg criticized the ma-
jority’s reading of the AEDPA as unsound and unwarranted.250  Petitions to 
the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, she stressed, “do not exist in a vac-
uum.”251  They arise from suits filed in lower courts and “[w]hen we are 
asked to review a state court’s denial of habeas relief, we consider an ap-
plication for that relief—not an application for federal habeas relief.”252  
She concluded that the majority’s unduly narrow interpretation of the toll-
ing provision was contrary to the intention of Congress and unfairly termi-
nates the tolling process before the Supreme Court has the opportunity to 
consider the merits of a prisoner’s claims.253 
Another controversial case from the 2006–2007 term adds to the evi-
dence that the current Court is polarized on death penalty questions and 
will tilt in favor of the state in the most significant cases.  Tellingly, in 
Uttecht v. Brown,254 Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion.  Ut-
techt raised a particularly important question—whether a Washington state 
trial judge had improperly granted a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss a po-
tential capital juror who expressed some qualms about capital punishment, 
but who also said that he would be willing to impose it in an appropriate 
case.255  The standard for excusing a capital jury panelist who acknowl-
edges that he is opposed to capital punishment, thus raising concern that he 
may not be capable of fair consideration of the prosecutor’s arguments for 
  
 246. Id. at 1085. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that neither indigent ordinary prisoners nor indigent 
death-sentenced prisoners are constitutionally entitled to the appointment of counsel to help them 
prepare petitions for certiorari to the Court or to help them in state post-conviction appeals.  See, e.g., 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
 249. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1085–86. 
 250. Id. at 1086–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 251. Id. at 1086. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1089–90. 
 254. 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007). 
 255. See id. at 2222–24. 
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imposing the death sentence in the penalty phase of the trial, was estab-
lished in 1985: “[W]hether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his in-
structions and his oath.”256  In Uttecht, the excused juror, during a lengthy 
voir dire, told the judge that he supported capital punishment, but would 
not be as inclined to impose it unless the defendant otherwise might go free 
and kill again.257  When asked whether he could vote for a death sentence 
if there were no chance of parole, the juror answered: “If I was convinced 
that was the appropriate measure.”258  Because Washington, like many 
death penalty states, offers life imprisonment without parole as the alterna-
tive to the death penalty, prosecutors argued that the juror’s responses 
showed that he would automatically vote against the death penalty.259  The 
trial judge’s decision to grant the request to dismiss the juror was reversed 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found that the 
trial transcript unambiguously showed that the juror was not “substantially 
impaired” and overturned the death sentence that the trial jury imposed.260 
Emphasizing that federal appellate courts owe substantial deference to 
a state trial judge’s ability to determine the qualifications of a potential 
juror, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion accused the Ninth Circuit panel 
of misreading the trial record and failing to accord the proper deference to 
the trial judge.261  Justice Kennedy pointed out that trial judges are present 
during the voir dire process and are in a much better position to assess a 
potential juror’s demeanor and thinking than are appellate courts, which 
have to rely upon a written trial transcript that cannot capture all of the 
nuances and human elements of what happens in the courtroom.262  He 
  
 256. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).  This standard was first articulated in Adams v. 
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).  Wainwright resolved a conflict between the Adams standard and the 
standard established in the pre-Furman case of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968) 
(permitting the exclusion only of “those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automati-
cally vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be 
developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would 
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt”).  See also Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.  It should be noted that the 
Supreme Court also has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires exclu-
sion from a capital jury of any venireman who makes it clear during voir dire that he would automati-
cally vote to impose a death sentence, regardless of the mitigating evidence.  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 
U.S. 719 (1992).  Morgan prompted an angry dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia, who was joined 
by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, and who asserted that the Constitution does not entitle 
a capital defendant even to identify during voir dire potential jurors who would ignore relevant mitigat-
ing evidence and automatically vote for the death penalty.  See id. at 739–52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 257. Uttecht, 127 S. Ct. at 2226–27. 
 258. Id. at 2227. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 2227–28. 
 261. Id. at 2228–31. 
 262. Id. at 2224. 
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added that the majority’s review of the transcript showed that the court of 
appeals was simply wrong and that the transcript revealed no “substantial 
impairment” on the part of the dismissed juror.263  Accordingly, the deci-
sion to vacate the death sentence was reversed and the case was remanded 
for further proceedings.264 
Justice Stevens wrote on behalf of the four dissenting Justices and 
minced no words in denouncing the majority’s holding.  He began by ac-
cusing the majority of going much too far in reversing the judgment of the 
federal court of appeals and extending a “completely unwarranted” level of 
deference to state trial courts in capital cases.265  It was clear, he added, 
that the federal appeals court carefully reviewed the transcript, correctly 
noted that the potential juror repeatedly affirmed in response to the prose-
cutor’s questions that he could impose the death penalty in any situation, 
and correctly applied the applicable Supreme Court precedents in deciding 
to reverse the death sentence.266  “Under our precedents, a juror’s statement 
that he would vote to impose a death sentence where there is a possibility 
that the defendant may reoffend, provided merely as an example of when 
that penalty might be appropriate, does not constitute a basis for striking a 
juror for cause.”267  The majority, he declared, had redefined the meaning 
of “substantially impaired” and gotten it “horribly backwards.”268  A death 
sentence should not be upheld, he concluded, when trial judges disqualify 
potential jurors whose only failing is “to harbor some slight reservation in 
imposing the most severe of sanctions.”269 
The death penalty decision that arguably provides the best evidence of 
the Court’s retreat from its 2002–2005 direction—and its likely path for at 
least the next several years—is Schriro v. Landrigan.270  The Landrigan 
case underscores the importance of Justice Alito’s presence on the Court.  
His predecessor, Justice O’Connor, joined five-to-four majorities in the 
two aforementioned cases—Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard—in 
which the Court signaled its willingness to hold defense attorneys to a 
higher standard than in past cases when evaluating claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel brought by death-row inmates.271  In Landrigan, 
however, Justice Alito provided the fifth vote to deny an ineffective-
  
 263. Id. at 2228–30. 
 264. Id. at 2231. 
 265. Id. at 2239 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 266. Id. at 2241–42. 
 267. Id. at 2241. 
 268. Id. at 2243. 
 269. Id. at 2244. 
 270. 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007). 
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assistance claim that raised issues similar to those in the Wiggins and Rom-
pilla cases. 
Landrigan posed the question of whether a federal district court had 
properly dismissed an Arizona death-row inmate’s habeas petition as so 
weak as not even to deserve an evidentiary hearing.272  Jeffrey Landrigan 
alleged that his attorney failed to do a reasonably adequate job of investi-
gating mitigating evidence, including his serious mental illness at the time 
of his crime and its origins in his turbulent childhood and the violent be-
havior and drug use of his biological father and other relatives who were 
not interviewed by the defense.273  Justice Thomas wrote for the majority 
and acknowledged that Landrigan’s biological father and other relatives 
were not interviewed.274  Justice Thomas, however, maintained that this 
lapse should be considered in the context of Landrigan’s behavior at his 
trial.275  He repeatedly interrupted his attorney, told him not to call his birth 
mother and ex-wife to testify on his behalf, and told the judge: “I think if 
you want to give me the death penalty, just bring it right on; I’m ready for 
it.”276  After recounting these facts, Justice Thomas abruptly concluded that 
the district court was correct to deny Landrigan a hearing because the new 
mitigating evidence Landrigan wanted to introduce was “weak” and 
“would not have changed the result.”277 
As he had done in Uttecht, Justice Stevens authored a scathing dissent-
ing opinion.  He attacked the Landrigan majority’s decision as “a parsimo-
nious appraisal of a capital defendant’s constitutional right to have the sen-
tencing decision reflect meaningful consideration of all relevant mitigating 
evidence, a begrudging appreciation of the need for a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of constitutionally protected trial rights, and a cramped reading 
of the record.”278  That record, he asserted, showed that the defense law-
yer’s investigation of possible mitigating evidence clearly was constitu-
tionally insufficient under the Court’s recent precedents.279  Landrigan’s 
bizarre behavior during his trial should not have been taken as a waiver of 
his rights and should have made the necessity of taking the appropriate 
steps to gather and present evidence of serious psychological problems all 
the more evident.280  Instead, significant mitigating evidence that would 
have shed important light on Landrigan’s criminal conduct was unknown 
  
 272. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1937. 
 273. Id. at 1937–39. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 1941–43. 
 276. Id. at 1943. 
 277. Id. at 1944. 
 278. Id. at 1944–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 279. Id. at 1945. 
 280. Id. at 1950–52. 
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at his sentencing.281  Accordingly, this was a case that, at the very least, 
warranted an evidentiary hearing.282  Justice Stevens declared that the ma-
jority’s decision “can only be explained by its increasingly familiar effort 
to guard the floodgates of litigation.”283  But, noting that it was already the 
case that district courts hold evidentiary hearings in only 1.17% of all fed-
eral habeas cases, he concluded that “[t]his figure makes it abundantly 
clear that doing justice does not always cause the heavens to fall.”284 
IV.  THE DEATH PENALTY IN RETREAT: FEWER EXECUTIONS AND 
GROWING POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
Uttecht, Landrigan, and most of the Supreme Court’s other major 
death penalty decisions in 2006 and 2007 strengthen the hands of prosecu-
tors and weaken the power of federal courts to grant relief to prisoners who 
have a constitutional basis for challenging their death sentence or the fair-
ness of their trial.  This trend is likely to continue in the 2007–2008 term 
and for the next several years.  However, it is apparent that the political 
momentum over the past decade has swung against capital punishment.  It 
is telling that the number of death sentences imposed by juries in the 
United States has declined to its lowest level in decades.  From 1986 to 
2001, the number of death sentences averaged 280 per year.285  However, 
the total fell to 169 in 2002 and then began to drop even more, to 153 in 
2003, 140 in 2004, 138 in 2005, 115 in 2006, and 110 in 2007.286  This 
decline almost certainly reflects greater public and juror awareness of per-
sistent problems with the death penalty.  Cases in which death-row inmates 
have been exonerated on the basis of new evidence have been highly pub-
licized in recent years.  As of February 15, 2008, 127 inmates in twenty-six 
states have been released because of compelling evidence of innocence.287  
The steady decrease in death sentences also has been attributed to growing 
concerns among jurors about racial discrimination in capital cases and to 
improved skills by defense attorneys in making arguments for mitiga-
tion.288  Furthermore, some prosecutors have become well aware of the 
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 283. Id. at 1954. 
 284. Id. at 1954–55. 
 285. Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Neil A. Lewis, Death Sentences Decline, and Experts Offer Reasons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
2006, at A28. 
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higher costs of prolonged death penalty cases and appeals as compared to 
life imprisonment without parole.289 
Deepening misgivings about capital punishment are underscored by a 
recent drop in the number of executions carried out each year in the United 
States.  Executions were slow to resume after the Gregg decision clarified 
the legal status of capital punishment in 1976.  From 1976 to 1991, the 
number of executions averaged slightly less than ten per year.290  From 
1992 to 2002, the average jumped to sixty per year, with highs of ninety-
eight in 1999 and eighty-five in 2000.291  Recently, however, a downward 
trend in executions has emerged, with sixty-five in 2003, fifty-nine in 
2004, sixty in 2005, fifty-three in 2006, and forty-two in 2007, the lowest 
since 1994 when thirty-one executions took place.292 
The precipitous drop in death sentences and executions has been ac-
companied by a noteworthy, but not overwhelming, decline in public ap-
proval of capital punishment.  The highest level of support came in 1994 
when a Gallup Poll found eighty percent of Americans to support the death 
penalty.293  In June 2007, a Gallup Poll showed the support level at sixty-
five percent and an August 2007 poll conducted by the Pew Research Cen-
ter found that sixty-two percent of U.S. adults favor retaining the death 
penalty for those convicted of murder.294  Research indicates that some of 
those who endorse capital punishment in the abstract would be willing to 
reconsider if they could be assured that murderers would be given a sen-
tence of life without parole.295  Nevertheless, with nearly two-thirds of 
Americans still expressing support for the death penalty, abolition on a 
national basis clearly is not imminent. 
In fact, it is possible that the decreasing number of executions and high 
public confidence in the efficacy of DNA technology could stabilize, or 
even bolster, public support for capital punishment by making the Ameri-
can people “much more confident that those receiving their last meals 
really are guilty of a mortal sin.”296  Similarly, the Atkins and Roper deci-
sions, though welcomed by abolitionists, may actually work to their disad-
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 290. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 285. 
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 292. Id.  Moreover, the vast majority of executions have taken place in southern states.  As of Febru-
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vantage in the short run.  The exclusion of mentally retarded and juvenile 
offenders from death penalty eligibility could very well have the effect of 
“sanitizing” capital punishment, making it more difficult to persuade peo-
ple that the death penalty is excessively or unfairly imposed. 
Regardless of trends in national public opinion polls, political opposi-
tion to the death penalty has gained momentum in a growing number of 
states.  For example, in May 2000, the New Hampshire legislature became 
the first in the nation to vote to abolish capital punishment in the post-
Gregg era.297  However, the bill was vetoed by Governor Jeanne Shaheen, 
and the legislature could not muster the two-thirds majority required to 
override the veto.298  New Hampshire thus retains its capital punishment 
law.  But arguably nothing has changed; the state has not executed anyone 
since 1939.299 
Also in 2000, Illinois became the first death penalty state in the mod-
ern era to impose a formal moratorium on executions.300  Former Governor 
George Ryan imposed the moratorium because of concerns that the Illinois 
system of capital punishment was plagued by error and caprice.301  Since 
the state reinstated capital punishment in 1977, he pointed out, twelve pris-
oners were put to death, but thirteen death-row inmates were cleared of 
murder charges, often only because journalists, students, and professors at 
Northwestern University unearthed vital exculpatory evidence that state 
officials had either missed or ignored.302  In 2002, the governor conducted 
clemency hearings for nearly every death-row inmate in Illinois.303  The 
hearings, replete with both the bloody details of gruesome crimes and 
shocking stories of erroneous convictions, created anguish for the families 
and friends of everyone involved.304  But in the end, Governor Ryan, de-
claring that “[o]ur capital system is haunted by the demon of error,” par-
doned four more inmates he said he believed to be innocent—bringing the 
total number of exonerated Illinois death-sentenced inmates to seventeen—
and commuted the death sentences of 167 others to life in prison.305  In 
January 2003, as his final act of office, he emptied his state’s death row.306  
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Legislators have been considering legislation designed to lessen errors and 
restore credibility to the capital-sentencing system, but as of February 15, 
2008, the moratorium remains in effect.307 
In May 2002, the governor of Maryland, Paris Glendening, imposed a 
moratorium on executions in anticipation of a comprehensive study of the 
Maryland death-sentencing process.308  The study found that Maryland 
prosecutors were far more likely to seek the death penalty in cases where 
black defendants were accused of killing white victims and that geography 
—the particular county in which a case was prosecuted and the attitudes of 
prosecutors in that county—was a major factor affecting whether a defen-
dant faced capital charges.309  In 2003, Glendening’s successor Robert Ehr-
lich, rescinded the moratorium.310  However, in 2006, Maryland elected a 
governor, Martin O’Malley, who strongly opposes capital punishment and 
who in 2007 sought its repeal by the Maryland legislature.311  In March 
2007, legislation to replace the death penalty with life without parole failed 
by a single vote in a Senate committee.312  Meanwhile, Maryland’s highest 
court has ordered a halt to all executions on the ground that the state’s le-
thal-injection procedures have not been properly adopted.313  Governor 
O’Malley has refused to issue regulations that may have allowed execu-
tions to resume, and in a July 2007 interview, he said that he would press 
the legislature to repeal the death penalty when it reconvenes in 2008.314  
Thus, Maryland now has a de facto moratorium on executions, and it is 
possible that it will abolish capital punishment in the next few years.315 
By far the most important victory yet for opponents of capital punish-
ment occurred on December 17, 2007, when New Jersey Governor Jon 
Corzine signed a bill to abolish the state’s death penalty.316  New Jersey 
thereby became the first state to repeal capital punishment in the post-
Gregg era.  The New Jersey legislature placed a formal moratorium on 
executions in 2006 and appointed a special commission to study the pros 
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and cons of abolition.317  In January 2007, the commission, citing the risks 
of wrongful executions, the exorbitant costs of capital litigation, and the 
dearth of evidence showing that the death penalty deters murder any more 
effectively than does life imprisonment, overwhelmingly recommended the 
elimination of capital punishment.318  In May 2007, the New Jersey Sen-
ate’s judiciary committee approved legislation to replace capital punish-
ment with life without parole and voted to release the measure to the full 
Senate.319  On December 10, 2007, the Senate voted twenty-one to sixteen 
in favor of the measure320 and three days later the New Jersey Assembly 
approved it by a vote of forty-four to thirty-six.321  Before signing the bill, 
Governor Corzine commuted the death sentences of the eight men on death 
row to life-without-parole sentences and said that he saw it as his moral 
duty to end “state-endorsed killing.”322 
Legislative momentum against capital punishment also is on the up-
surge in a number of other states.  In 2004, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the state’s highest court, declared the existing death penalty law 
(which was passed in 1995 and under which no one has been executed) to 
be unconstitutional.323  Since then, the New York legislature has rejected 
every effort to pass a new law.324  Legislatures in Nebraska, New Mexico, 
and Montana came close to repealing capital punishment in 2007.325  Alto-
gether, at least seventeen states currently are considering legislation that 
would either abolish capital punishment or impose a moratorium on it: 
Illinois, Maryland, New York, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington.326 
V.  NEW ISSUES FOR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
Not all of the political momentum leads in the direction of abolition.  
Over the past few years, several state legislatures including those of Geor-
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gia, Missouri, Utah, Virginia, and Texas have been considering measures 
that would have the effect of expanding the categories of death-eligible 
offenders.327  Texas, in fact, recently became the sixth state—joining Lou-
isiana, Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina—to authorize the 
death penalty for offenders convicted of the rape of a minor not resulting in 
murder.328  Shortly before Texas passed this law, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court, in State v. Kennedy,329 affirmed the death sentence imposed on a 
man convicted of the aggravated rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter.  
He appealed, in part, on the ground that executing someone for a crime that 
does not result in death is a grossly disproportionate punishment and there-
fore violative of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and 
unusual punishments.330  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
January 4, 2008,331 thus setting the stage for what promises to be the most 
controversial death penalty case of the 2007–2008 term. 
In Kennedy, the Louisiana Supreme Court evaluated the constitutional-
ity of a 1995 law permitting capital punishment for the aggravated rape of 
a child under the age of twelve.332  The court began by taking a close look 
at the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Coker v. Georgia to invali-
date on Eighth Amendment grounds the death sentence of a man convicted 
of raping a woman who survived his attack.333  Justice White’s Coker plu-
rality opinion never precisely answered the question of the constitutionality 
of capital punishment for those convicted of raping but not killing a child, 
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but the Louisiana Supreme Court stressed that the Coker Court referred to 
the question of the proportionality of executing the rapist of an “adult 
woman” fourteen times.334  Accordingly, the state supreme court concluded 
that Coker should be interpreted as clearly prohibiting capital punishment 
for the rape of an adult woman, but as leaving open the question of the 
constitutionality of executing those convicted of raping a child or those 
convicted of other brutal or atrocious non-homicide offenses.335 
The Louisiana Supreme Court next pointed out that even though the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the period following Gregg has not upheld the 
death sentence for anyone convicted of a crime which did not result in the 
taking of human life, the Court in both Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. 
Simmons declared that “capital punishment must be limited to those of-
fenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and 
whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execu-
tion.’”336  As the Louisiana justices saw it, child rape is the most heinous 
and despicable of all non-homicide offenses, and inevitably causes great 
harm and suffering to the victim.337  Moreover, adults who rape children, 
unlike the mentally retarded and juvenile offenders spared the possibility 
of execution by Atkins and Roper, cannot always be said to lack full moral 
blameworthiness for their crimes.338  Although executing mentally retarded 
and juvenile offenders arguably does not advance the legitimate purposes 
of capital punishment, “execution of child rapists will serve the goals of 
deterrence and retribution just as well as execution of first-degree murder-
ers would.”339 
Perhaps the strongest—and certainly the most intriguing—argument 
proffered by the Louisiana Supreme Court is the very argument that the 
Atkins and Roper majorities found to be so convincing: that when deter-
mining whether there is a national consensus that a challenged punishment 
offends contemporary standards of decency and thereby violates the Eighth 
Amendment, “it is not so much the number of these States that is signifi-
cant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”340  The Roper major-
ity, for example, found it significant that five states that had permitted the 
death penalty for juveniles prior to the 1989 Stanford holding changed 
their laws by the time of the Roper ruling.341  The Louisiana Supreme 
Court thus found it just as significant that since 1995, when Louisiana 
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amended its capital punishment statute to authorize the death penalty for 
the rape of a minor, four more states—Georgia, Montana, Oklahoma, and 
South Carolina—also addressed this issue and passed similar laws.342  The 
Louisiana justices acknowledged that these four statutes were somewhat 
more narrowly drawn than Louisiana’s statute in that Georgia requires the 
victim to be less than ten years old and Montana, Oklahoma, and South 
Carolina permit a death sentence only when the defendant has a prior con-
viction for the sexual assault of a child.343  These differences, however, 
mattered little; it was more significant that all of the states that changed 
their laws relative to the issue of permitting death to be imposed in some 
cases on child rapists moved in the same direction.344  Equally important, 
the court examined the death penalty laws of the other jurisdictions author-
izing capital punishment and found that fourteen states and the federal 
government do not restrict capital punishment to crimes resulting in the 
loss of human life.345  In addition to the five states providing for capital 
punishment in cases of child rape, nine more allow death sentences for 
such crimes as treason and espionage, as does the federal government.346 
The court concluded, however, that the most important evidence of the 
constitutionality of the child-rape capital punishment law was that five 
states have enacted such laws in spite of the confusion as to whether 
Coker’s prohibition of capital punishment applies to all rape cases or only 
to cases of adult rape: 
[E]ven after the Supreme Court decided in Coker that the death 
penalty for rape of an adult woman was unconstitutional, five 
states nevertheless have capitalized child rape since then, a number 
which the Supreme Court held in Roper was sufficient to indicate a 
new consensus regarding society’s standards of decency towards 
the juvenile death penalty.  In fact, the trend is more compelling 
than in Roper, given the Roper Court’s reliance on five states abol-
ishing the death penalty for juveniles after Stanford held that the 
death penalty for juveniles was constitutional.  Here, we have five 
states enacting the death penalty for child rape in spite of Coker, 
which held that the death penalty for rape of an adult was unconsti-
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tutional.  Furthermore, it is likely that the ambiguity over whether 
Coker applies to all rape or just adult rape has left other states un-
sure of whether the death penalty for child rape is constitutional.  
These states may just be taking a “wait and see” attitude until the 
Supreme Court rules on the precise issue.347 
It seems fair to say that the Louisiana Supreme Court has “thrown 
down the gauntlet” to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The state tribunal has taken 
the “consistency of the direction of change” argument employed by the 
Atkins and Roper majorities to invalidate death penalty laws and forged it 
into a sword to carve a path for upholding the constitutionality of child 
rape capital punishment laws. 
When oral arguments are heard in the spring of 2008, the state’s attor-
neys will point out that at least six states have passed such laws.348  Ken-
nedy’s attorneys, on the other hand, are likely to stress that the Court has 
long looked to another indicator of the existence of a societal consensus 
against a particular punishment—the frequency with which prosecutors 
seek and juries return verdicts imposing the punishment in question.  By 
the time the Court decides Kennedy, Patrick Kennedy may very well be the 
only child rapist on death row—at the most, one of a handful of such of-
fenders.  Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are likely to look 
favorably upon this evidence and to endorse other arguments against up-
holding these laws.  On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito almost certainly will point to the nascence of 
these laws and return to a counter-argument that such evidence is meaning-
less—one that Justice Scalia stressed in his plurality opinion in Stanford v. 
Kentucky: “[I]t is not only possible, but overwhelmingly probable, that the 
very considerations which induce petitioners and their supporters to be-
lieve that death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause 
prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed.”349 
In other words, why should the people of a state that has voted in a 
democratic manner to enact legislation to make it possible to impose a par-
ticular type of punishment on a particular type of offender be told by un-
elected judges that they will not be allowed to use the punishment at all 
because their prosecutors and juries have seen fit to proceed with caution 
and decency and thus to impose the punishment only in exceedingly rare 
cases in which the offender has committed a truly horrific crime with dev-
astating consequences for the victim or victims?  Justice Kennedy joined in 
this part of Justice Scalia’s Stanford opinion, but he implicitly rejected this 
  
 347. Id. at 788. 
 348. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 349. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989). 
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reasoning when he joined the Atkins and Roper majorities.  How will the 
Justice Kennedy of 2008 respond to this logic?  Indeed, as the author of the 
Roper majority opinion in which he embraced the “consistency of the di-
rection of change” argument that was first articulated in Justice Stevens’s 
Atkins majority opinion, how will Justice Kennedy respond to the use of 
this argument to justify the constitutionality of new death penalty laws?  
This case almost certainly will be decided by a five-to-four vote with Jus-
tice Kennedy providing the pivotal vote.  Moreover, it is likely to be one of 
many future death penalty cases in which Justice Kennedy’s reaction to 
arguments about how to interpret and apply the Eighth Amendment will 
prove to be decisive. 
This is a predictable scenario for another case on the Court’s 2007–
2008 docket.  In Snyder v. Louisiana,350 the Court will decide whether to 
reverse a death sentence on the basis of claims that the trial judge incor-
rectly granted all of the prosecutor’s motions to use peremptory challenges 
to remove qualified black venire members from the jury and subsequently 
permitted the prosecutor to tell the all-white jury in his closing argument 
that Allen Snyder, an African American charged with stabbing his wife to 
death, was in the same situation as O.J. Simpson, whom the prosecutor 
added, “got away with it.”351  Snyder and his attorneys contend that the 
judge’s handling of the jury-selection process and his acquiescence to the 
prosecutor’s closing-argument statements infected the trial with racial bias 
to the extent that the verdict and death sentence could not possibly meet 
the high standards of reliability required by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.352 
The facts in Snyder are similar to the facts in the previously mentioned 
case of Miller-El v. Dretke,353 a case from the 2004–2005 term in which 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion reversing a death sentence on 
the ground that the trial judge incorrectly found credible race-neutral rea-
sons for upholding peremptory challenges to ten of eleven eligible jury 
panelists.  On the other hand, it was Justice Kennedy who in the 2006–
2007 term’s Uttecht v. Brown354 decision authored the majority opinion 
that emphasized the superior position of trial judges in determining 
whether jurors could fairly impose capital punishment.  It is quite possible, 
of course, that in Miller-El, Justice Kennedy was influenced by Justice 
O’Connor, who joined the Miller-El majority opinion and who seemed to 
  
 350. 127 S. Ct. 3004 (2007). 
 351. See State v. Snyder, 942 So. 2d 484, 486–500 (La. 2006). 
 352. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Reconsiders Pivotal Louisiana Case on Racial Selection of 
Juries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at A22. 
 353. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra notes 254–71 and accompanying text. 
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have become increasingly skeptical of lower court decisions that rejected 
death-row inmates’ claims of racial prejudice.  This variety of skepticism 
apparently is not shared by Justice Alito, who joined the Uttecht majority 
opinion and who voted in favor of upholding the death sentence in every 
non-unanimous capital case in which he participated in the 2005–2006 and 
2006–2007 terms.  It would not be a great surprise if Justice Kennedy were 
to join with Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas in a five-to-four 
vote to extend Uttecht-like deference to the trial judge who presided over 
Allen Snyder’s capital trial. 
There is another closely watched capital case on the Court’s 2007–
2008 docket that could prompt a five-to-four split.  In granting certiorari in 
the case of Baze v. Rees,355 the Court accepted a petition from death-row 
inmates in Kentucky who claim that the lethal-injection process used to 
carry out executions in Kentucky (and in most of the states that authorize 
capital punishment) violates the Eighth Amendment by creating an unac-
ceptable risk that condemned inmates will suffer needlessly prolonged and 
excessive pain and agony.356 
In two nineteenth century cases, one involving the constitutionality of 
the firing squad as a method of execution357 and one challenging the newly 
invented electric chair as cruel and unusual,358 the Court opined, without 
formally deciding, that both methods of execution were constitutional: 
“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but 
the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as 
used in the [C]onstitution.  It implies there something inhuman and barba-
rous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”359  The Court 
has never found any of the methods of execution used in the United States 
—hanging, the firing squad, electrocution, the gas chamber, or lethal injec-
tion—to be unconstitutional.360 
In Baze, the Court will not declare lethal injection, in and of itself, to 
be an unconstitutional method of execution.  It is possible, however, that 
the Court by a close vote will hold that the particular three-drug protocol 
used by most executing states and/or the haphazard procedures sometimes 
  
 355. 128 S. Ct. 34 (2007), amended by 128 S. Ct. 372 (2007). 
 356. Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006). 
 357. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
 358. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
 359. Id. at 447. 
 360. The Court’s decisions against granting certiorari in cases raising constitutional challenges to the 
constitutionality of particular methods of execution sometimes have sparked vigorous dissenting opin-
ions.  See, e.g., Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) (declaring electrocution to be barbaric and unnecessarily cruel); Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 503 
U.S. 653 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting from order to vacate stay of execution) (avowing that execution 
by cyanide gas is inhumane and torturous). 
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used to administer the drugs can be violative of the Eighth Amendment.  
Ironically, if the Court does so, it may weaken the growing political mo-
mentum to abolish or sharply limit the use of the death penalty.  One rea-
son the current abolition movement has gained ground in recent years is 
because of mounting concerns that lethal injection, originally touted as a 
humane method of execution, may actually inflict greater pain and suffer-
ing than did previous methods of execution.361  Quite a few lethal injec-
tions have been botched, many taking more than thirty minutes while the 
condemned inmate struggled to breathe or to speak.362  Members of execu-
tion teams have testified that lethal injections have been carried out in 
dark, cramped rooms by non-medical personnel who often are unsure of 
the correct dosage of lethal chemicals necessary to ensure a quick death.363  
Moreover, evidence has emerged that the second of the three chemicals 
used in most lethal-injection states, pancuronium bromide—also known as 
Pavulon and long banned for use in euthanizing animals—causes extraor-
dinary pain while simultaneously paralyzing its victims, leaving them un-
able to move or talk.364  This means that if the first drug, sodium pentathol 
is injected in too small a dosage, the inmate will not be fully anesthe-
tized.365  As a result the third drug, potassium chloride, which induces car-
diac arrest, would be felt as an excruciatingly painful burning in the heart 
and veins.366  The prisoner, however, would be unable to cry out or other-
wise express his agony.367 
Concerns about the many reports of flawed executions and the very 
real possibility that this kind of torment has been occurring with some 
regularity have seemed to energize death penalty opponents and led to 
temporary bans on lethal injections in several states in 2007.368  Shortly 
after the Court granted certiorari in Baze, it began, without explanation, to 
grant stays of execution to death-row petitioners, a pattern that has recently 
been followed by other state and federal courts.369  The result is a de facto 
  
 361. See generally Elizabeth Weil, The Needle and the Damage Done, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb 11, 
2007, at 46; Megan Denver, Joel Best & Kenneth C. Haas, Methods of Execution as Institutional Fads, 
10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2008).  
 362. Elizabeth Weil, It’s Not Whether to Kill, but How, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at 43. 
 363. Weil, supra note 361. 
 364. Darryl Fears, A Reprieve in Nevada Adds to Lethal-Injection Drama, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 
2007, at A3. 
 365. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Enter the Debate over Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 
2007, at A24. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Stay Execution: A Signal to Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2007, at A1.  Justices Scalia and Alito have dissented from some of the Court’s stays of execution.  Id.  
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nationwide moratorium on executions, and none have been carried out 
since September 25, 2007.370 
If the Court decides Baze on the merits and declares the three-drug 
execution protocol to be unconstitutional,371 two consequences can be re-
liably predicted.  First, most executing states will adopt a less complicated 
protocol, perhaps injecting condemned inmates with a single, massive dose 
of barbituates—the way animals are euthanized.372  Second, public outrage, 
to the extent that it exists, over the use of a possibly torturous method of 
execution will diminish, and at least some of the steam will go out of the 
current movement to abolish capital punishment. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court is presently constituted, the dynamics of interac-
tion among the Justices appear to have influenced Justice Kennedy to cast 
his vote in favor of the state in the capital punishment cases that are par-
ticularly contentious and matter the most.  For the past two years, Justice 
Kennedy has been inclined to join the Roberts-Scalia-Thomas-Alito bloc in 
capital cases, and he is not likely to author another Roper-type majority 
opinion. 
As of February 1, 2008, the average age of Justice Kennedy and the 
four Justices who consistently vote in favor of death penalty laws is sixty-
two, with Chief Justice Roberts the youngest at fifty-three.  The average 
age of the four Justices who consistently vote to reverse death sentences is 
seventy-five, with Justice Stevens the oldest at eighty-seven.  Thus, even if 
a Democrat assumes the presidency on January 20, 2009, and even if De-
mocrats continue to maintain a majority of the U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives, the Court’s demographics are likely to work against a 
major change in the ideological tendencies of the Court in capital punish-
ment cases and other areas of law. 
  
 370. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 285.  On February 8, 2008, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court held that electrocution creates an undue risk of unnecessary pain, suffering, and mutilation of the 
body and therefore violates the Nebraska Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.  
See State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1 (2008).  Nebraska was the only state that relied solely on the electric 
chair as its method of execution—seven others permit inmates to choose it instead of lethal injection 
under some circumstances—and the Nebraska legislature is expected to consider enacting legislation 
that would replace the electric chair with a form of lethal injection that does not rely on the same se-
quence of three chemicals under review in Baze v. Rees.  See Adam Liptak, Nebraska’s Top Court 
Forbids Electrocution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at A9; supra notes 355–69. 
 371. The oral arguments in Baze were heard on January 7, 2008, and several Justices expressed the 
view that Kentucky’s only lethal-injection execution was not botched and that the Court thus might be 
wise, as Justice Stevens put it, to “wait for another case” to decide the issue.  See Robert Barnes, Le-
thal-Injection Ruling May Have to Wait, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2008, at A2. 
 372. Fears, supra note 364. 
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The Court’s present composition and decisional leanings almost cer-
tainly will trump politics and policy arguments in the near future.  The 
Supreme Court is likely to rule in favor of the government and against peti-
tioning death-row inmates in the most significant cases of the next several 
years.373  Moreover, the Court can be expected to reject every challenge to 
the constitutionality of capital punishment, in and of itself, for many years 
to come. 
Perhaps sometime in the next several decades, a Court composed of 
Justices yet to be appointed and confirmed to the highest court in the land 
will hold that the death penalty, under all circumstances, violates the U.S. 
Constitution.  Regardless, the ball now is clearly back in the hands of the 
opponents of capital punishment.  They will not be able to rely on the Su-
preme Court.  Rather, they will have to strengthen their arguments, extend 
their efforts to mobilize their supporters, and make a persuasive case for 
abolition to the American people.  This will require working harder than 
ever not only in Washington, D.C., but in the legislatures in every state 
capitol and in every courthouse where some human beings hold the power 
to choose death over life for other human beings. 
  
 373. Although a decision to deny a petition for a writ of certiorari does not amount to a decision on 
the merits, those who argue that the Court has not done enough to ensure that capital punishment is 
administered with sufficient fairness and due process can point to January 14, 2008 when the Court 
denied certiorari in Fields v. United States, 76 U.S.L.W. 3372 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008) (No. 07–6395).  
Fields was seeking a reversal of his death sentence on the ground that the sentencing jury was allowed 
to hear evidence based solely on hearsay about crimes he allegedly committed but for which he was 
never tried.  See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2007).  One of the most controversial 
death penalty issues yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court is the question of whether the state should 
be permitted to introduce during the penalty stage of a capital trial evidence that the defendant has 
committed extraneous, unadjudicated crimes in addition to the crime for which he has just been con-
victed.  Sixteen states currently allow such evidence to be admitted and six of these states admit it with 
virtually no limitations.  See generally COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 155, at 525–26. 
